The German Tribune

Hamburg, 7 December 1986
Twenty-fifth year - No. 1254 - By air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

C 20725 C
ISSN 0016-8858

Reagan decline leaves room for Europe to step in

DIE ZEIT

Most governments in Western Europe have yet to realise how rapidly President Reagan's nimbus has paled in his own country in the past few days.

The US President's political authority may have taken a tumble, but every crisis has its silver lining of opportunity.

How else is the decline in American leadership to be offset than by readiness on Europe's part to embark on initiatives of its own in the pursuit of political progress for the West?

Ronald Reagan may spend two more years in the White House but he will no longer be able to rule with the relaxed, winsome confidence that has been the past hallmark of his Presidency.

The wizard of Washington, defying the experts with a sure instinct and ear for applause to pull political successes like rabbits out of a hat, has forfeited his magic powers in the mess of the Iran arms deal.

He will never fully regain it no matter how much he may seek to restore his tattered authority by, say, the pawn sacrifice of his national security adviser, Mr Poindexter.

Reagan's aura is paling. Time and again he has intuitively brushed aside all objections amd misgivings and overcome Congressional resistance with his appeals to the nation.

He dealt in the politics of "belief" and "vision" — not for nothing do the terms recur in so many of his speeches.

Then his instinct let him down for once when, of all things, his mediocre advisers persuaded him to back a fresh Iran adventure.

Mr Reagan is now like a lame duck. The spell is broken, and with it the wizard. True, he is a past master at political resurrection. Even now he might conceivably brush the setback aside with a boyish gesture of the head and a winsome smile, suggesting to himself and the world at large that everything is back in order.

But it probably isn't. A pragmatic politician can iron out mishaps by means of sensible politics; a visionary who has come a cropper remains hard-hit.

Yet even people who have rejected President Reagan's policy in the past can have no cause for pleasure at his discomfiture.

Too much is at stake when the leader of the West has grown lame in the wing and there is still two years to go to the next Presidential elections.

Dark clouds have been gathering for some time on the horizon of world affairs. Weeks after the Reykjavik near-summit disarmament talks between the superpowers are marking time.


The meeting between Foreign Ministers Shultz and Shevardnadze in Vienna at the beginning of November ended on a note of discord and the meeting of US and Soviet experts planned for early December will make no headway either.

The two sides' positions have, on the contrary, grown more unyielding.

In Moscow the knot sealing Mr Gorbachov's Reykjavik package (no agreement on the scrapping of offensive missiles until America agrees to limit its SDI programme) is tied more tightly by the day while Washington, strongly **backed by European politicians** and military men, is busy abandoning positions that were hailed in Iceland as a major success.

The US government is increasingly setting aside the ABM Treaty, which bans the development and testing of ABM systems in outer space.

The opportunity of a major break*through in Reykjavik has been missed.* There is now an added risk of the vestiges of common viewpoints being trodden under foot in the hawks' hue and cry.



(Cartoon: Horst Haitzinger/Nordwest Zeitung)

The other risk lies not in East-West ties but in economic relations between America and Western Europe, with protectionists gaining ground in the November mid-term Congressional elections.

Secretary of State Shultz had already seen "warning signs of isolationism" in the United States, including calls, growing louder by the day, for protectionism which, he said, "would merely trigger retaliation by our trading partners and do America strategic, political and economic damage."

America's 1986 trade deficit is expected to amount to about \$140bn, while the combined surplus of the Federal Republic and Japan will amount to \$125bn.

So it is hardly surprising that America is tempted to solve its economic straits by battening down the hatches *and stemming the tide of competition* from abroad.

Under the self-assured President Reagan of old all may not have been well with disarmament and world trade, but the danger seems sure to be heightened under the new, lame in the wing Reagan.

Will a President who has always been fond of giving his hawks their head now come entirely under their wing? Will he, the last bulwark against protectionism, now yield to Congressional pressure?

Last not least, how can the West, led by a weakened US President, summon the self-assurance to resume and expand the dialogue with the other superpower?

Mr Gorbachov can be sure not to mark time in Soviet foreign policy merely because his opposite number is hard-hit.

Unless Western Europe is intent on hiding behind America's apronstrings again, the answer can only be that it is

Continued on page 2

IN THIS ISSUE

Washington loads up a bomber and goes over Salt limit

America has finally done what it has threatened to do for months: it has exceeded a ceiling laid down in Salt 2, a treaty never ratified, by equipping a B 52 bomber with cruise missiles.

It is one bomber more than agreed by the terms of the treaty. America now has 1,321 multiple-warhead carrier systems (a category including both strategic missiles and bombers). Salt 2 allows each side only 1,320 systems.

Mr Gorbachov attacked the move as contradicting the logic of Reykjavik. But the Soviet Union is not as pure as the driven snow either.

In American eyes the SS-25 is not just a modernisation but a prohibited new missile. Washington also sees the Krasnoyarsk radar complex as a breach of the ABM Treaty governing superpower anti-missile potential.

Views may differ on qualitative changes, but numbers are more straightforward, and one more B 52 with cruise missiles on board is one too many. Does that mean an end to disarmament? Other factors surely play a more crucial role.

Was this bomber essential for the security of the United States?

Hardly, given the state of America's existing strategic arms potential.

Besides, Nato is far from enthusiastic.

Even an otherwise so loyal supporter of President Reagan as Margaret Thatcher coldly announced that Britain would prefer both sides to abide by Salt 2.

Congress, which has a Democratic majority and is already clashing with the President over the Iran arms deal, also opposes the B 52 decision.

Yet President Reagan still has a loophole. He needs only to scrap two old Poseidon nuclear submarines, which America was planning to do in any case, to revert to the Salt 2 ceiling.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 28 November 1986)

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Row over sale of submarine designs to South Africa

Süddeutsche Zeitung

The sale of submarine blueprints to South Africa by a Kiel shipyard, Howaldtswerke (HDW), has created a serious political row.

The Federal government and the *Land* of Schleswig-Holstein, owners of the shipyard, feel deceived.

Christian Democrat Hans Stercken, chairman of the Bundestag's foreign affairs committee, says it is "more than a scandal" and a case of "white-collar crime."

Although the shipyard management has borne the brunt of the criticism, justifiably, critics have disregarded the fact that the Federal Republic has been caught in a trap of its own making.

Where arms exports are concerned, theory and practice are poles apart.

In 1977 the United Nations declared an embargo on arms exports to the Cape.

The only serious breach of the UN embargo in the Federal Republic that has come to light was penalised in May 1986 when four Rheinmetall executives who had sold ammunition plant to South Africa via Paraguay were given suspended sentences.

The men in charge at HDW would do well to study the court's ruling in the Rheinmetall case. The Rheinmetall executives are said at least to have approved risking causing serious damage to the country's external relations and laying the Bonn government open to suspicions of undermining the UN embargo.

Because of this ruling the public prosecutor is certain to bring charges against the HDW management if the accusations are confirmed.

This angle does not shed light on the full extent of the problem. In principle all Federal governments have seen the arms trade as a continuation of politics by other means.

The arms-manufacturing-and-export regulations are deliberately vague.

Six months before power changed hands in Bonn in October 1982 Chancellor Schmidt's Cabinet approved guidelines that have been retained in full by Chancellor Kohl's government.

They stipulate that Bonn may authorise the export of arms and military equipment to anywhere where the Federal Republic's "vital interests" warrant an exception to the general rule (which is that exports are only allowed to other Nato countries).

But arms cannot be exported anywhere hostilities might break out and they must not help increase tension.

These definitions make it clear that wide-ranging interpretations are possible, and two figures should suffice to show that Chancellor Kohl's Christian Democrats have little difficulty in living with the 1982 guidelines.

In 1983 alone the Federal Republic exported arms and equipment worth DM8.6bn, or DM500m more than the total exported between 1975 and 1980.

Politicians of almost all parties still pay lip service to us restrictive an arms export policy as possible. There are good reasons enough for a policy of this kind, one being the unforgotten role played by German armaments in two world wars.

Historical and political reasons are joined by a moral consideration in that much of Germany's arms exports now go to Middle East countries that might at any time stop being just a political opponent and start being a military adversary of Israel.

No matter how critical a view may be held of Israeli policies, we really ought to have learnt the lesson that Germans must never again either actively or indirectly contribute toward the annihilation of Jews.

(The comments made during Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauss's visit to Saudi Arabia were disconcerting.)

Economically too there is little point in trying to keep a too-big arms industry in business by exports.

That is to grow dependent economically and politically on customers some of whom one would not even like to shake hands with.

Against this background the argument "if we don't do it, others will" cannot be allowed to hold water.

Money earned from arms deals *can* stink. But politicians would be in a dilemma even if they stopped using the arms trade as an instrument of foreign policy.

Deliberate and effective export restraint would lead, given the current dimensions of the arms trade, to redundancies, especially in the ailing shipbuilding industry.

On this issue there is a functioning grand coalition of SPD-ruled city-states and free (export) traders in the Federal government.

As long as their interests coincide all concerned will prefer to live from hand to mouth rather than to embark on expensive economic streamlining programmes to bail out the coastal areas.

If the present policy continues there are sure to be more scandals.One alternative would be to limit arms exports to specific countries, such as OECD member-states.

Others would be to insist on a right to veto sales of jointly produced systems such as the Tornado, the Milan and the Alpha jet or to resolve to limit arms production in general.

Counter-arguments include the long list of potential customers and the gap between political rhetoric and economic interests.

Kurt Kister

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 28 November 1986)

Bomb case: Bonn expels Syrians

NÜRNBERGER Nachrichten

Relations between Bonn and Damascus are strained. Both governments are expelling each other's diplomats, withdrawing ambassadors and throwing accusations at each other.

President Reagan and Mrs Thatcher whose governments broke off diplomatic ties with Damascus a while ago and have failed so far in attempts to win European support for their hard line, will not be unhappy.

Germany and Syria were certain to clash sooner or later. Bonn had had to act when Syrian complicity in terrorist raids on German soil was revealed in a Berlin court.

(Two Jordanians were jailed respectively for 14 and 13 years for a bomb attack in March on the German-Arab Friendship Society in West Berlin. Nine peole were injured.)

Bonn's sanctions on Damascus are not overwhelming but they are enough to warn the Syrian authorities against too much help for terrorism.

They were also a warning to President Assad not to push his luck.

The Syrians could not afford to leave Germany's moves unanswered. Failure to respond would have been a tacit admission of guilt, and President Assad is in no mood to admit anything of the kind.

The conflict has been exacerbated but it remains predictable. Bonn, and that is the most important difference between its response and those of Washington and Whitehall, has stopped short at breaking off diplomatic relations.

Bonn and Damascus have not officially shunned each other. Foreign Minister Genscher, unhappy though he may be with Syria, has no intention of burning his bridges with Damascus.

This drastic move would hardly affect the Syrians either politically or economically, whereas it would block for the foreseeable future diplomatic channels to a country that is sure to play a key role in any solution to the Middle East conflict.

No country keen to retain influence in the Middle East can afford to do more than reduce its diplomatic presence in Damascus, and that is all Bonn has done.

The Syrian government, protest though it may, has no intention of bringing the conflict with the Federal Republic to a head either.

It has maintained strict parity in its counter-moves, indicating — as Herr Genscher has done — that the two countries are still at least potentially on talking terms.

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 29 November 1986)

Continued from page 1

now up to us. Europe must try to offset as far as possible the American policy shortfall and to reduce by initiatives of its own the risks inherent in the Reagan twilight. This presupposes three points:

First, Western Europe must stop once and for all merely voicing misgivings in Washington. Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has rightly warned against "suddenly making out disarmament, and not the arms race, to be the real danger."

Dispute over the zero option for intermediate nuclear forces is superfluous, not because it is the last word in military wisdom but because governments of Nato missile deployment countries have repeatedly committed themselves to it.

General Altenburg, latterly Bundeswehr inspector-general and now chairman of the Nato military committee, has stated with admirable clarity — a clarity that would have well befitted a number of his Nato colleagues — that:

"The zero option, whether we like it or not, is an idea that was inherent in the concept on which the dual-track decision was based, so I can hardly lament it now."

Instead of constantly clamouring for reductions in the Reykjavik programme Western European governments ought to be demanding progress on disarmament.

They must call in Moscow for intermediate nuclear forces to be scrapped by both sides despite SDI and in Washington for the Reagan administration not to abandon the terms of the ABM Treaty.

What is to stop the Western Europeans from drafting specific proposals on conventional disarmament in Europe the significance of which they have rightly reiterated since Reykjavik?

The appeals and procedural pirouettes they have made so far cannot be classified as serious politics.

Second, President Reagan must not be left to wage a one-man war on protectionism. Western Europe has a vital interest of its own in ensuring there is no further restraint on world trade.

If we seriously mean what we say we must abolish the trade restrictions the European Community and a number of its member-countries have imposed.

Given the modest growth forecast for the Federal Republic made by the "Five Wise Men," there is every reason to bring forward the tax reforms planned for 1988, thereby partly obliging the United States.

What would be left of German economic growth if America were really to batten down the hatches?

Third, the governments of Western Europe must pay keener attention to Western Ostpolitik while Washington is lying low.

There have been signs of European initiative, Mrs Thatcher and M. Mitterrand have held lengthy talks with Mr Gorbachov.

In Whitehall some members of Mrs Thatcher's government have already concluded from the US leadership weakness that Western policy may need to be reviewed in relation to a Soviet Union intent on modernisation and foreign policy mobility.

Chancellor Kohl refers hopefully to a fresh start even though he has failed to persuade the Russians to abandon the sulks occasioned by his ill-advised Goebbels comparison.

Why can he not summon the courage to clarify matters in a personal letter to the Soviet leader? Otherwise the Federal Republic will risk being too late to join the Western European convoy: Bonn could then provide nothing but ballast toward Western Ostpolitik.

The Reagan twilight is both a challenge and an opportunity for Western Europe. The Europeans must now show that Western strategy does not depend solely on America.

All that can be said for sure is that the present crisis cannot be resolved by lamentation and prayer, the usual European panaceas for political upsets.

Christoph Bertram

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 28 November 1986)

The German Tribune

Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH, 23 Schoene Aussicht, D-2000 Hamburg 76, Tel.: 22 85 1, Telex: 02-14733.

Editor-in-chief: Otto Heinz. Editor: Alexander Anthony. English language sub-editor: Simon Burnett. — Distribution manager: Georgine Picone.

Advertising rates list No. 15
Annual subscription DM 45

Printed by CW Niemeyer-Druck, Hameln.

Distributed in the USA by: MASS MAILINGS, Inc., 640 West 24th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011.

Articles in THE GERMAN TRIBUNE are translated from the original text and published by agreement with leading newspapers in the Federal Republic of Germany.

In all correspondence please quote your subscription number which appears on the wrapper, between asterisks, above your address.

■ HOME AFFAIRS

Kohl avoids thoughts of a total majority

Governing in a democracy would be a lot easier if you didn't have to keep on winning elections, once said French statesman Georges Clemenceau.

With two months left before the general election, Helmut Kohl and the CDU/CSU conservative group appear to have the opposite problem.

He and his party know that an absolute majority and the resultant dominance in the Bundestag would not be popular.

German voters have become sensitive on this point. The mere thought of an absolute majority is like to force voters away from the conservatives. And so this is the idea now being pushed by the opposition parties.

Up until recently the SPD's Chancellor candidate, Johannes Rau, was still talking of an absolute majority for his party.

But now most Social Democrats would be happy to prevent the CDU/CSU from getting an absolute majority.

Although the electorate may dislike the never-ending tug-of-war in a coalition comprising two or more parties, it does provide a kind of safeguard against political arrogance by the most powerful single party within that coalition.

The louder the opposition parties warn against an absolute CDU/CSU majority, the better the prospects for the FDP.

Despite poor showings in the *Land* elections in Bavaria and Hamburg it now look as if the Free Democrats need not worry about whether they will be able to win the 5 per cent of the votes needed for seats in the Bundestag.

The mere idea of an absolute majority for the CDU and CSU may persuade enough voters to vote for the FDP.

Politics is sometimes a very strange business. The only way of ousting Helmut Kohl from the Bonn Chancellery would be an election result in which the FDP fails to surmount the 5-per-cent threshold.

If the CDU and CSU together then failed to secure the absolute majority of seats in the next Bundestag Kohl would not have a sound basis to stay in government.

Either this speculation by the SPD is too bold or it is born of the horrifying thought that Kohl — and not Rau — could get the absolute majority in Bonn.

By issuing shrill warnings against a possible CDU/CSU majority, however, the SPD is involuntarily ensuring that the FDP will survive in the Bundestag and that Kohl will probably retain a sound majority.

From Helmut Kohl's point of view everything is going like clockwork.

He doesn't even have to worry about the faux pas he may make along the way.

The scandal surrounding the debt-ridden Neue Heimat property group, a bitter blow for the SPD, was a timely godsend for Kohl's election campaign.

Nagging doubts within the SPD itself about whether Willy Brandt really is the right man in the right place also came at just the right time.

Even the recent Land election successes of the Greens, which were mainly at the expense of the SPD, have also improved Helmut Kohl's chances of success.

The current Bonn government has certainly not accomplished incredible feats.

Its proclamation of a fundamental political change in the Federal Republic of Germany has only been effected to a limited extent.

Apart from individual policy fields, such as putting public finance back on an even keel, it has preferred to let the millstones grind at a very measured pace.

Crises, such as the one triggered by the Chernobyl nuclear accident, were cushioned in a traditional manner, in this specific instance by creating a new environment ministry at national level.

The problem of too many asylum applicants was only solved after East German authorities were more or less pressurised into taking steps to ease the situation.

At the moment it seems as if no more than this is needed to secure the support of the voters.

In all probability most West Germans have no desire to see sensational government initiatives, for example, in Bonn's policy towards Europe or the Eastern bloc countries.

Finally, the SPD's special arrangements with East German Communist party leaders on the setting up of zones in Central Europe free from nuclear and chemical weapons have perturbed rather than enthused many West Germans.

It's easier to swim with the tide than against it.

The average West German is not keen on political overexertion and by and large wary of ambitious ideas.

No-one, therefore, would be surprised to see Helmut Kohl's government cruise to victory, perhaps even comfortably, in the general election

The government's lacklustre character probably by and large corresponds to the modest expectations the average voter has when it comes to politicians.

Most voters are satisfied with their situation and with the fact that things are



not only not deteriorating, but that there is even a glimmer of hope that things might improve.

They want their government to steer clear of the aberrations of international politics.

The less fuss the better.

There are of course citizens and voters who feel very uneasy about this philistine attitude.

This is a good thing too.

After all, the problems facing the world are far from being solved and the Federal Republic of Germany is also confronted by plenty of difficulties, of which high unemployment is probably the worst.

The action of terrorists can also trigger alarm at short notice.

Yet it's extremely difficult to counter the usual inclination to tackle problems in a calm and composed way.

Opposition parties will not be able to overcome this basic problem via vehement protests and warnings.

The propagation of an absolute majority for the CDU/CSU is unlikely to worry Helmut Kohl.

The question is whether this is the objective he himself is pursuing.

During previous years he was content to play off the CSU and FDP against each other within the coalition.

Kohl would probably like to see a

Continued on page 4

Rau tries to rally SPD out of 'mood of defeatism'

Johannes Rau, the Social Democrat Chancellor candidate next month, says the party is sinking into a mood of defeatism. He says the issues are not being heard.

The fact is that Rau himself probably lacks the will to win. At least, he appears not to have the near-obsessive ambition needed for a candidate for the office of Chancellor.

In addition, elections cannot be won when campaigners themselves don't believe in basic objectives — the point being Rau's stated belief that the party can win an absolute majority.

The party has never really believed that this was possible. Now most members admit that it isn't.

A lot of voters feel the cause has already been lost, which makes discussion of the issues by Rau irrelevant.

The main concern of party chairman Willy Brandt is now to make sure the party emerges intact from the election.

So how is it that the Social Democrats find themselves with such a lukewarm candidate? The answers lie in the time he was nominated.

On 12 May, 1985, Rau's re-election as premier of North Rhine-Westphalia astonished both friend and foe. He left the CDU standing and the Greens didn't get any MPs at all.

He confounded the forecasts by showing that, after all, he did have voterappeal, and enough of it even to lure away traditional conservative voters.

This was the success which led to misjudgments. And it explains both why Rau was nominated and why he is likely to be unsuccessful.

Then, there were only three serious SPD candidates for the job: Rau himself, Hans-Jochen Vogel and Oskar Lafontaine.

Vogel was the SPD's main man during the 1983 general election, where the Social Democrats were clearly defeated. So he was a bad bet.

Although Lafontaine got an absolute majority in the Saar, it was too soon for a nationwide campaign.

So the party pinned their hopes on the man of the political centre, Johannes Rau.

With the help of a clear-cut campaign they hoped that the SPD would be able to return to power in Bonn.

Admittedly, many SPD members were sceptical and even Rau himself had doubts — not about his ability to be but his chances of becoming chancellor.

Following talks with Willy Brandt and Hans-Jochen Vogel, Rau accepted candidature on 15 September, 1985.

If Willy Brandt had been more circumspect he would not have urged Rau to take on this challenge.

Not once since Rau was nominated has the party really believed that the proclaimed objective of an absolute majority is realistic.

It always knew that an absolute majority would only be possible together with the Greens.

Whenever Brandt was asked to comment on the SPD's election objective his remarks sounded very sceptical despite the compulsory optimism.

This became clear in summer this year when Brandt said that 43 per cent would be a good result too.

A candidate cannot win an election campaign, however, when basic objectives are not even believed by campaigners themselves.

This fact of life also explains why Rau is now complaining that his election campaign "issues" are not being heard.

Voters who feel that the cause is already lost are no longer interested in good intentions.

Brandt's main concern is to ensure that the SPD emerges from the general election as an intact and still powerful party.

Rau's uncompromising election goal, however, is causing more and more SPD supporters to turn to the Greens, whereas support from the centre-right is not in sight.

Of the possible candidates, on the other hand, Rau is the most likely to be able to prevent whole chunks of traditional SPD voters from switching loyalties, especially in the traditionally SPD-strong North Rhine-Westphalia.

It now looks as if Rau himself no longer expects to get more than 40 per cent of the vote.

The latest objective announced by the SPD party presidium, namely to prevent a grand slam by the CDU/CSU, is something he can no longer ignore.

He quite rightly criticises the mood of defeatism, which could have been prevented even after the disastrous election result in Hamburg.

One could go even further by venturing the thesis that, in the final analysis, Rau lacks the will for victory.

No matter how much he slaves and struggles his ambitiousness lacks bite and his objectives lack the power-political orientation.

The "attitude" verging on obsession which is necessary to become chancellor in Bonn is missing.

Nevertheless, it is already clear that Rau will want to have a say in the SPD after 25 January, in particular with respect to the question of who will succeed Willy Brandt as party chairman.

This is one reason why Rau is not giving up the fight now.

It is obvious that many in the party will already start thinking about who, if the party does lose the election, is to blame for defeat.

There are rumours that party chairman Willy Brandt may be the main scapegoat.

The politicians known in the party as Brandt's "grandchildren" (Lafontaine, Schröder and others), however, have no interest whatsoever in a handing-over of power to the generation of the "fathers" within the party (Rau or Vogel, for example) before the party's next official congress in 1988.

At the same time, they know that the party does not forgive disloyalty, especially during an election campaign.

This explains why they too march side by side with Shadow Chancellor Rau, whose defeat they expect.

Brandt's own strategy for the coming years is not clear.

There is conjecture that Brandt does not feel that Rau has the ability to integrate everything Brandt views as worth integrating within the SPD.

This includes Rau's personal ability to regain political power.

The logical conclusion, therefore, is that Brandt's hopes are pinned on the younger generation.

Martin E. Süskind

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20 November 1986)

■ THE PARTIES

Hopes of an early 'supergrass' law torpedoed by Free Democrats

Plans to introduce a law providing for terrorists to avoid prosecution if they agree to turn state's evidence have been jeopardised by a Free Democrat decision to defer discussion of the matter. The plan had been worked out by the leadership of the coalition parties, the CDU, the Bavarian CSU and the FDP. But sections of the FDP membership rebelled against the idea, which was intended as part of broader anti-terrorist legislation. A question now is how the FDP leader, Martin Bangemann, managed a top-level agreement without first checking rank-and-file opinion.

No party has had so many setbacks as the Free Democrats. Yet they have managed to keep a certain cavalier air that often causes amazement and sometimes irritation.

Land elections in Bavaria and Hamburg confirmed that their steady electoral support is well below the minimum five per cent needed for representation.

Yet they are behaving in public as if they were sure of getting 20 per cent. It was as though there were no doubts about parliamentary survival hanging over their heads.

The Liberals are proud. They see themselves as guardians of democracy.

Few arguments hurt them as much as suggestions that they merely provide one or other of the main parties with a working majorities. But they come to terms with the role because it gives them a lot of influence. They benefit regularly from the reluctance of the electorate to give either of the two main parties an absolute majority in Bonn.

At their election campaign meeting in Bonn they have put the cat among the pigeons on the issue of terrorists and state's evidence.

This action seems like a desperate attempt to maintain a supposedly distinctive profile. That is the only explanation.

Once more they gave into their urge to be perfect and they threw away their original agenda — together with the "supergrass" item — to pose as guardians of the Holy Grail of constitutional democracy.

Objections can be raised to the supergrass plan suggested by Chancellor Kohl as a temporary measure.

But critics know that constitutional government would not have been brought to its knees either legally or politically by a temporary deal in an extraordinary situation.

The Liberals, in objecting both to the coalition agreement and also to their own leadership for agreeing with the agreement, were aiming to show a self-assurance, a display to the voters that they are not afraid of baring their teeth at their senior coalition partners.

The pathos of some delegates might have misled some into thinking that a political credo was at stake.

They would hardly have got the — more accurate — impression that a proposal based on expediency was being torpedoed by opportunism.

Delegates deliberately ran the risk of leaving the party leadership in the lurch and laying the party again open to accusations of not being as good as its word.

The party leaders appear not to have sounded out the rank and file. They were like caricaturesof themselves at the conference.

The leader, Economic Affairs Minister Bangemann, bore a resemblance to Shakepeare's King John — John Lackland, the king without a realm.

His luckless Cabinet colleague, Justice Minister Hans Engelhard, and parliamentary leader Wolfgang Mischnik performed feats of verbal acrobats.

They all tried to make out that both the original supergrass proposal and the conference resolution to drop it were equally good arrangements.

The Free Democrats' action, which was comical rather than skillfully acrobatic, might well means the end of the whole idea. But it also might not. It might be resurrected. Either way, the state will not be hurt.

The Free Democrats' main aim in Mainz was to make it clear there were issues on which they differed from the Christian Democrats.

The FDP has clearly endorsed a further coalition with the CDU/CSU, subject to the (surely self-evident) proviso that it will retire to the Opposition benches if the Christian Democrats gain an absolute majority.

The occasional delegate may have felt a little unhappy about the FDP having no alternative but to opt for the CDU as a coalition partner at present, but this time there were no calls for the party to wait until after the elections before deciding who to join forces with.

There can be no doubt that the Liberals have come to terms with their switch from the SPD to the CDU/CSU and feel fully justified in having switched allegiance — such a controversial decision at the time — by the way the SPD has developed since 1982.

Nothing short of a general election fiasco on 25 January (and no-one is contemplating that) would require the Free Democrats to reconsider their alliance strategy.

At present they are quite happy with their opposition role within the coalition.

Ludwig Harms

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 24 November 1986)



Continued from page 3

continuation of this situation. If there is one art the otherwise not so masterly Chancellor masters it is the art of balancing between various political forces.

Having to rely on the constant support of Franz Josef Strauss, which would be the case in the eventuality of an absolute CDU/CSU majority, may cause him too many headaches.

Wolfgang Wagner

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 22 November 1986)

CSU and FDP in apparent role reversal

The state's evidence issue has thrown up a strange reversal in public images of two parties, the Bavarian CSU and the junior coalition partner, the FDP.

The two have held their general election conferences respectively in Munich and Mainz.

The Liberals usually favour, as their name implies, a liberal approach to serious criminals who see the error of their ways. But at Mainz, they wanted none of the supergrass idea and the thought of a terrorist getting off.

By comparison, some CDU politicians are said to regret the abolition of capital punishment. But here they were, suddenly appearing to be sympathetic towards terrorists.

Both are expecting that by revealing their differences instead of what they agree on, they will win more votes next month.

The Free Democrats see the CSU as a miserable bunch of yes-men. The CSU sees the FDP as an unreliable lot.

The clash over the best means of fighting terrorism may weigh heavily on the Bonn coalition but goes nowhere near breaking strain. Both know each needs the other to be sure of an absolute majority.

At the FDP meeting, the suggestion that the murderer of Gerold von Braunmühl, a senior Foreign Office civil servant gunned down in Bonn, might get off scot-free by informing on fellow-terrorists, was the pivotal point.

The vision of Braunmühl's assassin gaining his freedom as a supergrass, with a new identity and DM1m in cash, was clearly as emotive as it was extreme.

It certainly failed to do justice to what was an almost despairing attempt to split the deadly atom of hard-core terrorism.

There is nothing new about the Free Democrats going back on a coalition agreement — neither for the CDU/CSU nor for the FDP itself.

It might have been expected that FDP leader Martin Bangemann would have made sure of rank-and-file support before giving the coalition the go-ahead. Yet when he looked for support, he found himself out on a limb.

In Mainz he explained with some difficulty why he had changed his mind. It was not; he said, vacillation but the realisation that the new-found FDP compromise was right.

In principle the Free Democrats were still in favour of a state's evidence provision, but no matter how important the testimony, a supergrass ought not to get off scot-free.

It was for the courts to decide on the merits of the case what degree of leniency was appropriate.

This seems to have put paid to the original proposal, which may well have been the intention. The issue has been shelved and is no longer raised except at election meetings.

The FDP feels it has done the Bonn coalition a good turn. In reality its aim was to limit the damage done in its own ranks.

And, of course, it was an opportunity of demonstrating on the eve of a general election that the FDP has a profile of its own on legal issues.

Federal Interior Minister Friedrich

Continued on page 15

■ ANNIVERSARIES

Berlin: a city's mayor looks at what the past means for the future

Berlin celebrates its 750th anniversary next year. In all these centuries, the most drastic changes have been since the war. Berlin is divided. But it also where Germans of both east and west live closest together. Eberhard Diepgen, the Mayor of Berlin, wrote this article for the German foreign affairs periodical, *Aussenpolitik*. It appears in two parts. The second part is next week. Berlin is the political heart of the Federal Republic of Germany's ties with the West. But its position also gives it a crucial role in improving ties with the East, particularly the GDR.

AUSSEN POLITIK

Berlin — East and West — will celebrate its 750th anniversary in 1987. This is not much of an age for a European city but time is only one of the important issues here. One must think of the historic and current-day development of East-West relations. Berlin is the most manifest consequence of the Second World War. Geopolitically, the city lies in the centre of Europe and is still the only feasible capital of all Germans. As a divided city, Berlin symbolises the division of Germany and Europe. Here, the open-mindedness of the metropolis coincides with the confinement caused by the division. Even if Berlin is no longer a source of tension, East-West politics and East-West relations cannot bypass the city.

It is all this that makes living and working in Berlin so fascinating and, ultimately, accounts for the significance of the 750th anniversary next year.

The Germans' handling of their history essentially emanates from and is marked by Berlin. The city's political function will be highlighted in the anniversary year by the *Zentrale Historische Berlin-Ausstellung*, a number of conferences and, above all, the founding ceremony for the *Deutsches Historisches Museum*. These events are meant as a contribution to the bid to create a German and European consciousness of history. The idea here is not to provide a cohesive historical picture. Instead, the objective is for the anniversary year to open up a variety of perspectives on the common history. A contributing factor here can also be the — latterly more differentiated and broader — perception of German history in East Berlin and the GDR, which I expressly welcome. The 25-year division since the construction of the Berlin Wall, while painful to the people, is historically a relatively short time considering the city's 750-year shared past. Not only in an anniversary year occupation with history in the West and in the East heightens the awareness of perspectives beyond the present but also of questions as to whither and whence.

It is our intention to use the 750th anniversary for a forward-looking pinpointing of Berlin's, Germany's and Europe's positions and conveying this to Berliners, to all Germans and to our partners throughout the world.

It would be wrong to delve at length into the internal development prospects of the city in these reflections that are predominantly concerned with the future tasks of the city in the light of foreign policy and *Deutschlandpolitik*. But it would be equally wrong to leave them unmentioned because, more than with any other city, the internal development here is a significant element of foreign policy. It was, after all, the Soviet Union that pinned its hopes on drying out Berlin from within — in vain. Economic performance and internal vitality are the necessary preconditions of a successful future for the city. Every additional job created in Berlin therefore has both a national and an international dimension. But this does not mean that Berlin will in the future again ask for sacrifices on its behalf as was the case in the 1950s. On the contrary; the new Berlin must and wants to create its own attractiveness, banking on the solidarity of the federal government and the states. Investing in Berlin is not only politically praiseworthy; it must above all be economically secure, lucrative and promising for the future.


What will matter in the anniversary year is also to point to the naturally evolved interplay in the city between science, business, politics and society. Only thus is it possible to explain the fact that — notwithstanding the element of brutal high capitalism in the *Gründerzeit*, the founding years of Bismarck's Reich — many innovations came from Berlin in the last century, ranging from the continent's first steam engine all the way to Bismarck's first social legislation. Today, the city has 180 research institutions staffed by 40,000 people. Although Berlin accounts for only three per cent of the Federal Republic of Germany's population, 11 per cent of the country's scientists live in that city; and the time span from laboratory results to marketable product is shorter here than elsewhere. The concentration of scientific and ecomonic potential, backed by predictable and competitiveness-promoting framework conditions created by the state, gives Berlin a significant siting advantage in the current phase of industrial innovativeness. Among the sectors with a promise for the future are energy, transport, information and biotechnology, flexible automation and well thought out services. Tying these sectors — along with East-West trade — to Berlin is the best provision Berliners can make for their future, including the city's freedom and security.

A Frenchman would regard Berlin as being geographically on the edge of the East and politically on the edge of the West; a Pole would tend to place Berlin more in the West. Geopolitically, Berlin is marked by a central position. In fact, the city has always been centre and border at the same time.

Berlin was the centre of Prussia and of German unification in 1871; it was the spiritual centre in the 1920s; and it was the centre of National Socialism and of the resistance against it. Berlin is a centre that ensures that the Bonn republic does not succumb to a confining Rhine federation mentality. Berlin forms a centre that stands in the way of an exclusive East orientation of the GDR. Berlin is in the centre of Europe where the peaceful struggle for the hearts of the people amounts to a struggle for dominance in Europe; where borders meet their limits; and where the uncoupling of Eastern Europe from an all-European identity is being prevented. And, above all, Berlin is the centre of the divided nation as things stand now. Almost all intra-German affairs relate to Berlin, and most human encounters between Germans in the West and Germans in the East take place via Berlin.

But Berlin also stands for borders — most brutally visible along the Wall — and for antitheses from which and with which the city lives. In an earlier era, Brandenburg marked the border to the East. Prussia's Berlin stands for the small-German solution in the search for the one Germany. Berlin's history stakes out the limits of German influence in Europe. And it was in Berlin that important delineations were drawn: between monarchy and republic, between democratic republic and dictatorship, between liberation and occupation, between occupation and democratic new beginning, between East and West and between freedom and the socalled really existing socialism. Nowhere has the consciousness of the people been so heavily marked by a border as in Berlin — especially in East Berlin. Berliners experience social contrasts: The extraparliamentary opposition, the squatters and one faction of the Greens-Alternatives drew a line and still draw a line between themselves and the rest of society. In reality, they are an often imaginative part of this pluralistic society.

Centre, border, contrast — this is the field of tension within which Berlin must live. And this is why the very existence of



Berlin is an admonishment calling for moderation and reason, open-mindedness and tolerance, reconciliation and understanding, compromise and consensus.

This is evidenced not only by a look at the political map but also by the complicated web of treaties and legal provisions governing Germany and Berlin; ranging from the London Protocol and the 1944 agreement on control institutions, the Basic Law (Constitution) and Allied reservations, the *Deutschlandvertrag* of May 1952 in its amended version of October 1954, the Berlin Declaration of the Allied Kommandatura of 5 May 1955 and the 1957 Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic Community all the way to the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin of 3 September 1971 and the German-German Basic Treaty of 21 December 1972, along with all the addenda and subsequent agreements plus augmenting correspondence and declarations. The interlacing in political and treaty terms of the Four-Power Agreement and the Basic Treaty and indeed the whole of the European web of East-West treaties that have proven a stable contribution to security and stability in Central Europe have also proved viable for Berlin as a whole. Yet important though all this may be it can ultimately provide a firm basis only if all parties show the political will for it to do so. The status of the city must be upheld to the greatest possible extent not only *de jure* but also *de facto* without limitation and for the whole of Berlin. But, by the same token, it must not become a corset that impairs breathing for Berlin (West). What is called for is not formal and half-hearted rearguard battles but forward-looking political answers. I expressly agree with France's President François Mitterrand who said during his Berlin visit on 10 October 1985: "Berlin has a special status — a status that must be preserved though it must not put the brakes on the exercise of basic freedoms nor must it become an obstacle for the further development of ties with the Federal Republic of Germany as laid down in special agreements. It must also be no obstacle to progress in developing relations with the environs of the city."



Mayor Diepgen ... questions of whither and whence. (Photo: Werek)

The GDR will try to make use of the celebrations marking the 750th anniversary of Berlin to bring about at least psychological status changes in its favour through "visit and culture diplomacy". This could put us in a difficult position. While on the one hand we want as many East-West contacts as possible, we are, on the other hand, also responsible for the upholding of the Four-Power status of Greater Berlin. Only a differentiated and pragmatic strategy which looks at both viewpoints on a case-to-case basis can provide a solution. One thing is certain in this context: We must not counter the indisputable broadening of East Berlin's function by a mere insistence on formal legal positions which many people no longer understand. Instead, we must in our turn seek a broadening of function for the Western part of the city. The preconditions for this are good in view of the guarantees by the protective powers, Berlin's ties with the federation, its membership in the European Community and, above all, the political, economic and scientific innovativeness of the city. What matters is to acquire new supra-regional institutions — of a political nature as well. Why, for instance, should what began in June 1982 with the Berlin peace initiative of US President Ronald Reagan and is now acquiring concrete shape in Geneva and elsewhere not more than hitherto take place in Berlin? Why should the necessary bloc-transcending permanent institutions of the future — such as for nuclear safety, environmental protection and trade — not operate in

Continued on page 6

This is the first of an occasional series to mark the 750th anniversary of Berlin next year.



■ PERSPECTIVE

European leadership changes had pivotal role in changed relationship with US

This is the second of a two-part article written for *Die Zeit* by former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who is a senior member of the paper's editorial staff. The first part appeared last week.

At present, and probably in the foreseeable future, the conceivable degree of independence for the countries of Eastern Europe will depend to a decisive extent on Western Europe's success or failure in the pursuit of its interests.

If Western Europe were to succeed in exerting influence on overall US strategy in the direction of a balance of military power, arms limitation and troop reduction and corresponding agreements with the Soviet Union would be bound to strengthen the Eastern European countries' position.

Much the same would be the case if the European Community were to succeed in making progress toward economic integration.

The better shape the Common Market and joint European Community monetary, financial and trade policies take, the greater the predictable, positive spin-off for the countries of Eastern Europe.

So it is no exaggeration to say that in the second half of the 1980s the extent of Western Europe's self-assertion will for both Western and Eastern Europeans be the *yardstick for the self-assertion* of Europe as a whole.

For the remainder of the 20th century the alliance of the United States with the states of Western Europe will continue to be viewed as a strategic *sine qua non*.

Similarly, US and Canadian leaders will continue to view their alliance ties with the states of Western Europe as strategically indispensable.

So there is no real risk of the Atlantic alliance breaking up no matter how often some pundits may seek to shock us with this vision.

Yet opportunities exist, and ought not to be forgotten, of economic and strategic emancipation for Western Europe within the framework of this alliance.

America will remain by far the most important and most powerful ally in military, political and economic terms.

Washington tends to make full play with the US clout both within the alliance and toward the European Community, just as it does at the annual Western economic summits where Japan is regularly represented alongside America, Canada and Western Europe.

Washington today tends to be egocentric and isolationist in its egoism. Europeans must come to realise that such US inclinations tend to be reinforced, and not offset, by European submissiveness.

The evident decline in influence of Western European governments in Washington is due in part to leadership changes in Paris, London and Bonn.

But a more important part was (and continues to be) played by the international economic structural crisis beginning in 1973/74 and, more particularly, by the second round of oil price increases in 1979 and 1980.

Between them they left the countries of Western Europe and the European Community incapable of a concerted attempt to cope with their fresh round of economic woes and of arriving at a joint approach to America's forthright policy of running up budget deficits that has weighed heavily on the entire world since 1982.

Indeed, since 1981 even progress toward integration of the European Community, which the United States has in no way hampered, has slowed down substantially under pressure from the economic structural crisis.

This is a point on which no illusions must be harboured despite the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the Community.

On the monetary front the Community was neither in a position to forestall, cushion or offset the wildest vagaries of the dollar exchange rate nor capable, in recent years, of expanding its own monetary system, the EMS, set up in 1979, or its currency unit, the ECU.

On the financial front the European Community, in common with Japan or, for instance, the Latin American countries, has since 1982 had to suffer a large part of its accumulated capital and savings being exported from Europe to finance US budget deficits, leaving investment quotas within the European Community inadequate and continued high unemployment as a result.

Thus Europe today lacks a strategic concept for both security and economic policy. Europe lacks leadership. Its heads of government are preoccupied with unrest in their own chicken-run.

In the past 40 years Europe has more than once enjoyed the benefit of leaders with long-term orientation, such as Churchill, Monnet and Schuman, Adenauer, de Gasperi, de Gaulle.

Britain today would hardly be inclined to assume the leadership because British mentality and tradition repeatedly make Britons feel maintaining their special relationship with the Americans is more important than their reluctantly accepted identity of interest with the Continent.

The Federal Republic of Germany is clearly ruled out as a leading power in view of recent German history and the division of the country.

Various reasons would seem to rule out as illusory any idea of a lead being given by Italy or Spain or the smaller countries of Western Europe.

Those who place their hopes instead on collective leadership being given by, say, the European Commission or the Council of Ministers in Brussels or the "European Council" of European Community heads of government ought realistically to abandon hope in view of the constant harmless inefficiency of these bodies.

That leaves the possibility of French leadership. In the early 1960s President de Gaulle was willing and able to give the lead. Germany would have done better to follow his lead; Italy and the Benelux countries would have followed suit.

In 1963 the opportunity was missed by all parties in the Bundestag, but that need not mean it has been missed for all time. It does, however, presuppose a courageous, strong-willed French leader.

He must be resolved to integrate the French armed forces in a joint Western European defence concept. He must also be able to make out a credible and acceptable case to his fellow-countrymen for this future French role.

French and German conventional forces alone would be almost enough to amount to an adequate counterweight to the massed conventional forces of the Soviet Union and to strike a balance of power.

A defender does not by any means need exactly the same number of troops as an attacker. There would, of course, need to be a French supreme commander. There would also need to be a certain amount of extra conventional equipment and, of course, extra defence estimates.

The financial resources of the Federal Republic are, of course, somewhat greater than those of France. They will need to be made available.

There are more politicians in France than in Germany who can lay claim to long-term foresight, and they know that in the long term only a close Franco-German entente can firmly integrate the Federal Republic in the West and lend legitimacy to our German hopes.

In the long run that is something the new political elite from the south and west of the United States will not be able to do.

Under resolute French leadership, with Germany firmly resolved to coop-

Continued on page 7

Continued from page 5

Berlin; in fact, why not in both West *and* East Berlin? Such strategies would benefit Berlin and harm no-one.

The interaction between the German question and the division of Europe makes it obvious that Berlin policy and *Deutschlandpolitik* cannot be directed at the East alone but must be directed at the West as well.

The unequivocal decision of the Federal Republic of Germany in favour of Western democratic values and its being part of the European Communities and NATO have enabled us Germans (West) to dispel the latent worries of our Western neighbours over German unpredictability. Our ties to the West out of both an inner drive and a sober assessment of our interests are the irrevocable foreign policy consequence of our opting for freedom and self-determination. Joint US, British and French guarantees of West Berlin's freedom document the fact that ours is more than an alliance based on common interests. It is primarily an alliance based on values that the Western part of Europe and North America have in common. These values amount to the avowal of reason as the key to the understanding of the international order; the belief that the individual is born with inalienable rights; the approval of the community of people that was entered into voluntarily and is yet binding and the approval of a legal order that draws a line between the individual and the community.

In future, too, this must not be permitted to be called into question. We can put political weight behind a sober and calculable *Deutschlandpolitik* and *Ostpolitik* only if we make it clear to all and sundry that we are firmly on the side of the Western democracies. It is in our interest to not only continue adhering to these ties with the West but indeed to intensify them. This must apply not only to considerations of security and the maintenance and shaping of relations between the European and the American members of NATO. There is more involved than the intensification of our ties with the West. We have a vested interest in promoting the political unification of Europe. The great challenges which we will have to face in addition to the question of peace include a clean environment and famine, poverty and over-population in the world. None of us can single-handedly solve these problems. As Western democracies we can arrive at answers that hold a promise of success only through joint effort — and in some instances even through East-West cooperation. And time is of the essence.

A unilateral German road between the Eastern and Western blocs, as is increasingly and obliquely being mooted by individual Social Democrats, is not only unrealistic but would run counter to our interests and is thus undesirable. It would endanger Berlin and jeopardise political stability in Europe. There would be no future for a neutral Germany in the centre of Europe. Sooner or later, such a Germany would fall prey to the political influence of Europe's biggest power, the Soviet Union.

The Federal Republic of Germany's joining NATO and the *Deutschlandvertrag* were one complex. Our ties to the West conversely mean the commitment of the allies and the NATO partners to the German question. The Frenchman Pierre Hassner described the original alliance treaty as follows: "Germany opts for the West, but the West accepts the problem of Germany's division as its own". The fact is that the partition of Germany is also a partition of Europe and hence a European problem. It was necessary to draw attention to this, and not only in connection with a remark made in Italy that Germany should remain divided and that the fact of two German states should be perpetuated. Berlin's 750th anniversary will be another reason to underscore this. I doubt whether it is sustainable in the long run for some people in the West — acting out of legitimate political and economic considerations — to do something which they reject for reasons of *Deutschlandpolitik*, particularly with a view to Berlin (West). What I sometimes miss in the Alliance, close and trusting though cooperation might be on the whole, is a better coordination between responsibilities in matters of Berlin policy and *Deutschlandpolitik* and the justified wish for a broad East-West dialogue with the inclusion of the GDR and its seat of government.

Berlin (West) as the political core of the Federal Republic of Germany's ties to the West has a triple function in this context:

1. We must keep stressing to the West that Bonn and Berlin will not and may not tamper with the ties to the West, which includes the definition of our own interests within the Alliance.

2. We must promote our national objective of preserving the oneness of the nation and, if necessary, point to the common obligation to do everything possible in order ultimately, peacefully and by consensus to overcome the division of Berlin, Germany and Europe.

3. We must ensure vis-a-vis our protective powers and allies that East-West contacts safeguard Berlin interests without permitting Berlin to become an irritant in international affairs; and in doing so we must ensure that Berlin increasingly moves from being the subject of action towards being the actor.

Eberhard Diepgen

(Aussenpolitik, Hamburg, No. 4/1986)

Continued next week



Friedrich Krupp , Alfred Krupp , Friedrich Alfred Krupp , Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach , Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (Photos: Krupp)

■ DYNASTIES

Krupp, the flagship of industry that became a technological supermarket

The beginnings of the Krupp dynasty almost ended in ruin. In 1811, 175 years ago, Friedrich Krupp, 26, set up a foundry in Essen with the aim of making steel and steel products like the British were making it.

But he ran into both technical and financial problems and, unable to match the quality of British steel, the firm ran into its first crisis — in 1848, after Friedrich's death.

It recovered, of course. The first Krupp is unlikely ever to have imagined what a leading role the dynasty was to play in German industrial history or that the family name was later to become a byword for quality steel and munitions.

For decades, under the aegis of five generations of the family, Krupp of Essen also stood for German hard work and technological progress.

Friedrich died in 1826. His widow and Alfred, his son, laid the groundwork of its international reputation during the boom years in the Ruhr, between 1848 and 1887, the year Alfred Krupp died.

It owed its breakthrough less to the guns (they were manufactured later) than to the latest production techniques for certain qualities of steel.

The most significant innovation in the firm's early years was its invention of the seamless railway locomotive wheel. The three rings in the Krupp logo symbolise it.

Later innovations of major technological importance included new manufacturing processes, especially for stainless steel.

Krupp today has long ceased to be a purely family firm, and both corporate policy and the categories of product manufactured have undergone striking changes.

The family home, Villa Hügel in Essen, once a centre of political power with influence extending as far as Berlin, is now a museum.

The 175th anniversary of the firm's foundation was not taken as an occasion for full-scale celebrations.

Krupp has also ceased to be the flagship of German industry. In its heyday, in 1943, over 200,000 people could claim to be members of the Krupp "family."

It remained the largest German company until quite recently. It still has a payroll of nearly 70,000, but Krupp is no longer one of Germany's Top Ten industrial enterprises. Krupp shares with other steelmakers this relegation from the top rank. Chemicals, motors, fuel and power have come to the fore, leaving the formerly rich and powerful steel industry a crisis-torn also-ran.

The last chapter to close in the firm's history came to an end on 31 July 1967 with the death of Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach at the age of just over 60.

The fourth-generation Krupp at the helm of the family firm had made arrangements just in time to sever the family's links with the day-to-day running of the firm. He had persuaded his son Arndt, who died earlier this year, to accept an allowance in lieu of his birthright and bequeathed the family's fortune to a Krupp Foundation.

The foundation's task was to take over ownership of the new joint stock company, the Fried. Krupp GmbH, which has since been in charge of the firm's activities.

The foundation is otherwise a charitable, non-profit body mainly concerned with promoting science and the arts.

Alfried Krupp, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison in 1948 in place, as it were, of his ailing father, Gustav, had never seen his wealth as a purely private, capitalist matter.

It was confiscated for a while after the war and he spent six years of his 12-year sentence in jail. His attitude toward the family fortune he had inherited was most significant.

Assets, he said back in the 1950s, are a social obligation. This tenet is also embodied in Basic Law, the 1949 Bonn constitution.

A shy person who lived quietly and shunned the bright lights and publicity, he outlined his social views at a company celebration on 1 April 1967, three months before his death.

"Concern for job security was what prompted me after the war to keep going not only the basic materials sector but also most of the group's established companies," he said.

"I deliberately chose not to be actuated primarily by profit motives. It is part of the Krupp company tradition never to view profit motives, important though they may be, independently of the social obligations incumbent on personal property.

"Our firm has made great sacrifices for the sake of this obligation now as in the past."

The first Krupp, Friedrich, was not alone with his money troubles. In 1967 the end seemed nigh. The firm seemed to be on the rocks on account of unsatisfactory export financing arrangements and it was definitely a touch-and-go situation for a while.

It took a government credit guarantee for what nowadays seems a modest DM300m to ease the pressure of what was by no means the first (or, indeed, the second) time the firm had been on the brink of financial ruin.

Krupp only really recovered financially when, between 1974 and 1978, the Shah invested DM1.4bn in the company and Iran took over a quarter share in the parent firm and the various steelworks, which remained separate entities under company law.

Ties with Iran did not turn out to be the "draft for a grand design," as they were somewhat prematurely termed at the time.

But the substantial cash transfusion enabled Krupp to put its finances on a firmer footing, especially in view of steel and shipbuilding losses.

Despite this massive financial fillip from the Middle East, repeated claims of a breakthrough were overrated. Krupp failed to emerge as a newly structured technology group with few if any ties with steel.

Loyalty to established traditions may arguably have stood too long in the way of the fundamental reorientation as envisaged.

It was certainly handicapped by management problems encountered in the 1970s, although the chairman of the foundation's board of governors, Berthold Beitz, 74, the last Krupp's associate and executor, has ruled the roost almost absolutely since 1971.

But managing directors created difficulties more than once in the course of the decade. There were five board chairmen in the 1970s.

Manpower problems grew less serious in the late 1970s and can be said to have created few difficulties since 1980, when the present chief executive, Wilhelm Schneider, took over at the helm.

In the early 1970s Günter Vogelsang as managing director favoured steel and metallurgy even though Krupp's steelworks presented frequent problems before 1975 and the beginning of the European steel crisis.

Krupp tried more than once to sell its steel interests, but never quite succeeded.

That may have been because senior management were more firmly attached to this cornerstone of the company than they were prepared to admit.

Krupp without steelmaking interests would certainly have meant some kind of identity loss.

Another traditional mainstay, shipbuilding, came a cropper three years ago when the Krupp shipyard, AG Weser, shut down in Bremen.

The group was left mainly with what in past decades were seen as peripheral activities, such as plant construction, mechanical engineering and trading.

The erstwhile steel firm became a kind of technological supermarket, albeit a giant among supermarkets. It still has a payroll of about 67,000 and annual turnover well in excess of DM10bn.

Restructuring is not just a slogan; for Krupp it is a necessity. Krupp steelworks have shed over DM1bn in assets. Shipbuilding has lost a packet too. So have other activities by the group's 100-odd companies. Most of these loss-making activities have since been scrapped, but profits have taken a tumble, as has earning power, as a result.

Turnover between 1975 and 1985 totalled well over DM120bn, but profits over the decade totalled only a little over DM300m. In other words, for every DM1,000 in turnover the firm earned a meagre DM2.50 in profits.

Krupp today claims to be one of the largest European companies in the capital goods industry. Its high tech sectors include Spacelab and the first German super-computer, Sprenum, plus high-speed trains for the German Federal Railways.

Research spending totals DM250m a year. "Ideas make history" remains the slogan of a 175-year-old firm.

Leonhard Spielhofer

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 21 November 1986)

Continued from page 6

erate, three main tasks could be solved by the end of the century:

- Speeding up what at present is a very slow and foot-dragging process of economic integration within the Community framework by expanding the European Monetary System and setting up an independent, joint central banking authority first to control the ECU and, second, to ensure the existence of an adequate counterweight to the dollar and the yen.
- Setting up a conventional military alliance including France.
- Drawing up a joint security and overall strategy.

Once it is clear that Europe's future self-assertion will largely depend on whether and how France is to play a leading role in Europe, the Continental countries will surely accept a French leading role.

The United States too, as the most generous country in the world, would not withhold its acceptance either if only it could be sure that European developments, although they might reform the organisation of the North Atlantic pact, would consolidate, not jeopardise, its survival.

After all, the Americans would even be spared the need to maintain part of their military presence, a presence that is growing ever more burdensome, in Europe.

The European Defence Community as planned in the early 1950s did not envisage an American supreme commander either. Soviet political leaders may be shocked by such aspects of this future European development. They are bound to fear the effect its attraction it may have on their own empire.

But they would tend to welcome the political and military incoporation of the Federal Republic and eventually come to accept it.

Are these vain hopes, dreams, illusions? The faint of heart and those with a clerical turn of mind might feel so.

But such hopes are no less realistic than the views espoused by John F. Kennedy in 1962 and by Charles de Gaulle in 1963.

Helmut Schmidt

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 21 November 1986)

■ ENERGY

Gas exploration declines as pricing policy bites

DIE WELT

Natural gas is now paying the price for linking its cost to crude oil. Gas has been forced into the same depression its competitor, crude oil, is experiencing.

In August the price for imported natural gas was on average 24 pfennings, 37.4 per cent below the price quoted in August 1985.

Production costs in the producing countries are unknown, so it cannot be said if they are making a profit from gas sales or not. Profitability is influenced by where the gas comes from, geology and the size of the reserves anyway.

Gas that comes from the depths of the North Sea or from Siberia, that has to be piped to consumers in a complicated gas pipeline system, not only demands extensive financing but also the patience of Job waiting for capital recovery.

Under such conditions it is a bitter burden to swallow a loss of 20 per cent on average throughout the year.

It is more than likely that many gas sources have become only marginally profitable because of the fall in prices.

What is certain, however, is that the producer countries are no longer undertaking exploration. In this there is the danger for consumer countries that natural gas supplies will be scarce and prices will soar.

Doubt has now been cast on the basic philosophy supplier countries have held that a permanent economic advantage must be guaranteed for every single gas project. But there are exceptions to this.

At the beginning of the 1980s several European countries negotiated fixed-price agreements with gas supplier states.

The importer countries now have to face up to the fact that the supplier states' exports include not only their gas but their profit problems.

The French have landed themselves in the soup with problems of this kind. In June Gaz de France, along with the Belgians, the Dutch and Ruhrgas AG signed an open-ended contract with the Norwegians.

The contract was to be the basis for the development of the Troll natural gas field, located about 100 kilometres north-west of Bergen and about 900 kilometres north of Emden. It is estimated that this field contains 1,300 billion cubic metres of natural gas.

It increased Norway's natural gas reserves to 2,300 billion cubic metres, which would go a long way to covering West Germany's natural gas requirement until the year 2020.

In the European gas consortium's contract France is to take up eight billion cubic metres of natural gas from the Troll field, the Belgians and the Dutch two billions each, and West Germany eight billion cubic metres like the French.

Small quantities of natural gas would begin to flow by 1993, increasing to the full contractural volume by the year 2000.

The approval of the governments of the companies signing the contract had to be given by October. This has been done by all except the French. At the last moment politicians in Paris added to the contact conditions that the Norwegians found unacceptable. The French wanted to adjust their adverse trade balance with Norway by large orders from Oslo for French industry.

Norwegian Energy Minister Arne Oien rejected this out of hand. He said that a special condition of this kind would discriminate against the other contracting partners, that it could be a precedent, and that the whole Troll project was calculated so finely that there was no leeway in the project.

The leeway for Norway is that the project offers the chance of profits and jobs for Norwegians. No-one is prepared to surrender this to Paris.

The French now have until November to approve the contract, which has already been signed by Gaz de France officials.

French statistics for natural gas imports and consumption up to the year 2000 show that the eight billion cubic metres of natural gas the French would take from Oslo under the contract would be needed.

The belief is now growing then that the French have a considerable nuclear power-plant over-capacity, which they would like to push over to their eastern neighbours, including West Germany, but so far they have had no success to any noticable extent in doing this.

The fear is that if the French renage on the Troll project the entire venture would fall apart, so that West Germany's natural gas requirements up to the year 2000 would be jeopardised.

Arne Oien then provided information that calmed fears. The Troll project operators, British Shell, have let it be known that construction costs for the smaller volumes would drop from 25 million kroner to 21 million.

Paris has also decided that the Troll field project should go ahead so that West Germany's natural gas supplies into the next century have been assured.

Unconnected with the discussions conducted with the French Oslo has also been negotiating with the Italians and Spanish about natural gas supplies to ensure that the Troll field is developed.

A contract was signed some time ago with the Austrians for the supply of one billion cubic metres annually with this in mind.

The Belgians, Dutch and the Federal Republic are not in a position to increase the volume of natural gas they have contracted to take, since there is no increased demand there.


Troll shows how difficult it is to develop new energy sources in times when there is an energy surplus.

If the oil price remains at its present low level billions will have been tossed into the ocean to no avail.

The Norwegians are gambling on the likelihood that the oil price will once more increase considerably, for then the natural gas price would follow suite, so that from 1993 onwards the Troll field would supply gas at a profit.

Hans Baumann

(Die Welt, Bonn, 25 November 1986)



It's a flaming good heating fuel — especially at the cost

Natural gas is a relatively new kind of energy. In the early 1960s cheap fuel oil began replacing coal for heating. Fuel oil still dominates as a means of providing heating.

Natural gas hesitantly came on the scene in the mid-1960s. After the 1973 oil crisis consumers turned more and more to electricity and natural gas. This development was triggered off to some extent by wanting to secure energy supplies.

In the past few years more than a half of new buildings have been equipped with natural gas heating systems.

The heating market includes private homes, companies and industry. In the past year this market amounted to 196 million tons SKE (One ton Steinkohleneinheiten, or SKE, is equal to the energy in one ton of hard coal). It is expected that the demand for heating will increase by about ten per cent in the current year.

Households and small businesses are the greatest users of energy. This group requires 118 million tons SKE. Natural gas has a 22 per cent share of this market.

Industry requires 78 million tons SKE, 23 per cent of which is provided by natural gas.

Oil once accounted for over 50 per cent of heating requirements. Today it accounts for only 32 per cent or 63 million tons SKE. Natural gas is now in second place providing 23 per cent of heating requirements or 44 million tons SKE.

Electricity comes next with 21 per cent of 41 million tons SKE.

Hard and brown coal have fallen back to 14 per cent or 27 million tons SKE.

Seven million households out of the total of 24 million in West Germany and Berlin currently use natural gas. It has the advantages of not requiring storage space, follows close on the heels of the fuel oil price and is in the main non-polluting. Like water it comes from a tap in the wall, as it were.

Market research into the natural gas industry has revealed that in 1990 about eight million households will be using natural gas for heating and cooking.

For the most part supplies of natural gas are assured. West Germany itself has resources that account for 29 per cent of requirements.

The Dutch supply 32 per cent, the Norwegians 13 per cent and the Danes two per cent.

The Russians currently supply 24 per cent of West Germany's requirements.

The West German natural gas industry obtains its supplies exclusively then from non-OPEC sources.

Supplies have been assured by contracts that run from between 20 and 25 years. The supplying countries are very keen to sell their gas.

They have invested billions in exploiting sources and maintaining them and for carrying the gas to the frontiers of the consumer countries.

They realise only too well that profits can only be made if their is a continuity of supplies.

On 1 October the supplier countries dropped their prices by 30 per cent. Their reason for during this was the development of the oil price during the January-June period.


Since the oil price dropped even further in the second half of the year it is likely that on 1 April next year, or even on 1 January, the natural gas price will be further reduced.

Many communities that get their supplies for natural gas supplier companies are now negotiating for a price adjustment every quarter.

Gas prices have been adjusted on 1 April and 1 October. In future they may also be revised on 1 January and 1 July.

Consumers will then enjoy the benefits of a falling oil price quicker. But consumers will have to pay out more when the oil price rises for with it the natural gas price will increase.

(Die Welt, Bonn, 25 November 1986)



■ THE ENVIRONMENT

Chernobyl, the Rhine and the price of the future

There were striking similarities between the German nuclear power industry's claims after Chernobyl and the chemical industry's claims after the Basle blaze that polluted the Rhine.

Power utilities reassured all and sundry that German reactors were as safe as houses.

Hardly had the fire been put out at the Sandoz chemicals depot but German companies (Sandoz is a Swiss firm) said German chemical plant was safe and costly additional safety precautions were unnecessary.

Mention of human error, of firefighting staff being caught unawares and of breaches of laws and regulations tends to distract attention from the far more explosive issue of whether the facts as they stand can be warranted.

Radioactive fallout from Chernobyl showed the Federal and *Land* governments to be appallingly helpless. No-one coordinated advice to the worried German public.

Just in time for the state assembly elections in Lower Saxony Chancellor Kohl decided on a "political" solution to the fallout problem in making Walter Wallmann Environment Minister.

Herr Wallmann showed undeniable skill in handling the situation in the wake of the Soviet reactor catastrophe.

Coordination proved a problem as pollution flowed down the Rhine too, not to mention serious shortcomings in the flow of information between riparian states — shortcomings that triggered hectic activity.

Commissions have met and approved new emergency plans and better communications. But the old pattern seems likely to be repeated.

Mistakes will be identified and shortcomings rectified, but further activity, let alone thought, will be dismissed as unnecessary.

Is it really? Politicians and industrial executives will certainly hope so. No German power reactor was shut down after Chernobyl and no German chemical works need have fears of closure after Sandoz.

Slipshod Russian workmanship is contrasted with its quality German counterpart. Swiss negligence and compliance with the wishes of leading industrial companies are contrasted with German thoroughness. All the old excuses are trundled out.

After Chernobyl the invisible radiation risk was what upset people. In the Sandoz affair pollution of the Rhine, an emotive issue in any context, tended to make people think more in terms of the German river than of the international waterway.

Industry has been quick to marshal rational figures to stem the tide of irrationality. Mention is made of a few hundred thousand dead fish, of a few dozen miles of biologically lifeless river and of local water supply bottlenecks.

(Cartoon: Behrendt/Der Tagesspiegel)

But there is said to be no risk to human life and limb. So why talk in terms of a catastrophe?

Yet who would have thought beforehand that in clean and orderly Switzerland substances were stockpiled in the immediate vicinity of a major city that could have obliged the authorities to evacuate the entire population if the fire had spread from one warehouse to the next?

Whoever knew that the dangerous substances were not exotic compounds but everyday raw materials? An accident, possibly arson, has kindled the flames of a risk Europeans seem readily willing to run because it lays the groundwork of their prosperity.

The risks that came to light have grown such an everyday matter of course that we hardly see them in terms of danger any more.

An industrial society can unquestionably not eliminate vestigial risks. It would be wishful thinking to hope for the total elimination of risks and irresponsible demagogy to promise it.

Yet this realisation warrants neither fatalism nor playing matters down for all they are worth. It calls for energetic action in three sectors.

First, everyone is entitled to be subjected to nothing more than the inevitable vestigial element of risk.

We all have the right to expect manufacturers and factory inspectors to do all they can to eliminate risks.

Catchment basins for firefighting water, central warning systems, standardised analysis procedures and tried and tested emergency plans may individually be insignificant, but safety is first and foremost the sum total of working safeguards.

Such safeguards cost cash. They trim profits. They limit investment that might conceivably create jobs and help to keep companies competitive.

Human sacrifices cannot be costed. Seveso, Bhopal and now Sandoz have cost more than settling damages claims; they have cost confidence too.

As accident follows accident references to industrial safety outlay have an increasingly hollow ring.

Experts are naturally more clearly aware than the layman how dnagerous their work is, but day-to-day contact with risks tends to make them less vigilant.

Laymen with their naive anxiety are viewed with displeasure by the experts both as protest campaigners and as opponents in planning procedures.

Pride comes before the fall, and the price experts pay is inability to see the wood for trees — until disaster strikes and disproves official reassurances that nothing serious can possibly happen.

Too many people still fail to realise that inspection can be useful.

Second, everyone is entitled to know what vestigial risks remain. The nuclear power industry has been forced by public opinion to come clean on this point — and safety standards have improved as a result.

The chemical industry long hoped it might be spared this bitter chalice. It might yet be spared it this time round; people do tend to have short memories.

But in the long run there is no getting round the truth, which is that the chemical time-bomb is ticking away no less dangerously than its nuclear counterpart.

It is no less accident-prone and, being more widespread, can be said to tick the louder of the two.

Third, we must stop and think. Not even the Soviet Union is likely to know the full extent of long-term damage Chernobyl may cause. No-one can yet really say what havoc the Sandoz spill will wreak on the Rhine's eco-system.

Even so, a single blaze — a simple accident — has upset the precarious balance between the environment and its use by mankind.

That ought to make us stop and think whether we really should manufacture everything we are capable of producing and whether short-term progress is justifiable in the long term.

The free market is no excuse for taking no care of nature, from which we all — and our descendants — hope to live and benefit.

Can we expect industry to pause for thought? Probably not. Competition at home and abroad, European Community regulations, jobs and safety standards are sure to be trundled out by politics and industry.

Yet repetition doesn't make them any the righter. A full-scale catastrophe will one day occur, requiring the whole range of regimentation that is now kept at bay by saying only a few eels and micro-organisms were killed.

People have yet to be poisoned, and that may be all that counts in the run-up to a general election.

A Soviet power station triggered the debate on German reactor safety. A Swiss firm has triggered the debate on safety standards in the German chemical industry.

That surely shows how untenable it is to argue that national safety precautions are all that matter. Pollution crosses borders as readily as clouds and rivers. That at least is one respect in which Europe is united.

The chemical safety debate may for

Continued on page 15

■ FILMS

Documentary festival goes down a cul-de-sac

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

The Duisberg documentary film week celebrated its 10th anniverasary this year, but despite the wealth of films shown the festival has, over the years, ended up in a cul-de-sac.

This has happened despite new festival management and programme changes such as including Super-8 and video productions and works by young, unknown directors.

The Duisburg festival continued to show a preference for more formal documentaries, as regards aesthetics and content, rather than the considerable range of films of this sort, a film genre that is not very popular anyway.

There were no works in this year's film week from directors making important and intersting documentaries, directors not particularly interested in making a film for a particular audience but just keen to make a film. That is frowned upon in the Duisburg festival where the political standpoint is more important than the film craft employed.

This year this attitude was underlined by the disdain shown to the seldom-seen documentary by Ulrike Ottinger *China — Die Künste — Der Alltag* (The arts and every-day life in China).

You can go around in vain looking for a showing of this undoubtedly important documentary film that looks at an unknown country and its culture by using most unconventional, but productive, methods.

Years ago the film week got itself into an awkward position as regards its attitude to certain film-makers. The result is that film critics and the film world generally now scarcely take much notice of it.

Major documentaries by important documentary film-makers are not shown at Duisburg because the directors know that very little public attention will be given to them.

This does not prevent the organisers, however, from announcing some re-showings of documentaries as premières. This is what happened with *Wie man sieht* by Harun Farocki and *Heimkinder* by Gisela Tuchtenhagen.

An additional disadvantage for the film week is its relations with television. The number of TV films shown, mainly from the Third Television Channel, has got out of hand.

Television is certainly the most important financier and customer for documentary film-makers, but there is no point in mentioning every production made for this medium.

It is obvious that television has the last word about the programme when at least a third of the films included are pleasing but perhaps trivial productions such as *Wer umarmt wen* by Felix Kuballa, or *Der Fall des Elefanten* by Volker Anding, or *Die Grenze* by Alexander Honory and Tomasz Magiersky.

This year the film week was like a television film festival for it featured the four-hour-long documentary by Heinrich Breloer on the history of the third programme and included a discussion with experts on the history and the future of television from a legal and the general public point of view.One of the most beautiful films at the film week, made for, and premièred by television, was Irene Dische's *Zacharias*. The film is a portrait of her father, the famous bio-chemist Zacharias Dische. It has an inventive commentary and puts him in a central position in his discipline.

There are a number of sequences in the film that are more or less dramatisations of situations and sentiments.

Irene Dische manages to achieve an overall view in her film by using this method that should not be under-estimated in documentary film-making, because it enriches the viewer's understanding of the events filmed.

But few documentary films sustain these levels. Either film-makers concentrate their efforts on trivialities that interest them personally, or, as is so frequently the case, they are not on top of their material. More often than not both these factors come into play.

The high point of the Duisburg film week was the showing of the five-part film *Heimkinder* by Gisela Tuchtenhagen, although this was badly slotted into the film week programme. Again this film was made with assistance from television.

It deals with a group of young offenders who live in a home that is not run along traditional lines. They are preparing for their school leaving examination and go on several long trips to Portugal.

Gisela Tuchtenhagen, who did the camera work herself, gets top marks for the impressive way she shows what can be achieved with the well-tried methods of observation by means of participation.

The film critics documentary film award, made in Duisburg for a number of years, was shared between Gisela Tuchtenhagen's *Heimkinder* and Ulrike Ottinger's *China — Der Künste — Der Alltag*. This last film has already been singled out for an award at the Berlin Film Festival.

Irene Dische was given an honourable mention for her *Zacharias*.

Stijepo Pavlina

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 16 November 1986)

An international event? Not really, Munich

Munich's fifth international festival of productions from film schools and academies showed the diametrically opposite views taken by the younger generation of film-makers in the West and the East.

The festival pin-pointed precisely the trends, attitudes, possibilities and limitations among the younger generation of film-makers.

Honesty in film-making is manifestly not yet entirely sacrificed to commercial interests.

It is hard to understand, however why this display of work, although it has all the usual features of a festival such as competition, a jury, prizes and lots of ballyhoo is regarded as "an international festival."

The paradox of the situation has not become obvious to the organisers, the Munich film week company and the television and film academy.

This was made clear in the opening speech made by the head of the academy, Wolfgang Längsfeld, who smugly got lost in his own euphoria over his plans for expansion.

The international quality of the event was in fact supported by two non-European countries; Israel and the United States, that half-heartedly took part but did not send a single film from any of the most important US film training centres such as the University of California in Los Angeles and Robert Redford's Sundance Institute.

The most important contributions came from Europe, mainly Hungary. Poland and Britain.

The younger generation of British directors from the Royal College or the Nation Film School showed that they had grown in stature in their treatment of social problems. In productions such as *War Games* or *Pirates* they dealt with the civil war in Northern Ireland and the street violence among the young in Britain's major cities.

The crisis that has beset the British film industry for many years seems to have triggered off a new ceativity among the younger generation of directors.

The prize for the best work as a whole, awarded by the avant-garde television station "Channel 4" was justifiably given to the London Royal College.

The British were exceptional in their ability to make intelligent criticism and reflect on social realities. In most of the other contributions from Denmark to Italy there was a retreat into a private world, mainly with a lot of dialogue put into scenes that were poorly staged.

The astonishingly high standards of the camera work could not cover up the vaculty of the films.

Most of the 140 films shown did not present well-thought-out story lines and they were limited to two or three psychological situations.

The dialogue nearly always began with something like: "A young woman accidentally meets a man," or "A son seeks his mother," or "A daughter comes into conflict with her mother," or "Children ask about the meaning of life."The Polish film *Beste Wünsche* was successfully convincing in conveying a subject of this sort. Although the material was scanty the film indicated once more the high standards of the film academy at Lodz, whose pupils fight shy

Continued on page 11

A boost for shorter productions

Once upon a time a cinema visit was like going out for a superb dinner. There was a choice main course, preceded, of course, by an appetizer such as a news reel and, naturally, a dainty morsel, a short film.

That is long a thing of the past. Nowadays cinema programmes are clogged with 45 minutes of advertisements, and the short film booked to be screened with the feature film is left in the can.

But something is to be done for the short film, a reservoir of original ideas and stylistic innovation from which feature film directors can create something lively.

Film promotion legislation stipulates that a short must be shown with every feature film that has been given official backing.

Cinema owners who want to enjoy tax benefits must show a short along with the feature film.

There are plenty of short films shot, we just don't see them because there is no room for them in over-burdened cinema programmes.

The Berlin organisers of the third European short film festival set out to change the present situation that prevails in the short film world.

Supported by the Berlin Senate and Radio Free Berlin people interested in the German cinematic art set out to establish a mini-Berlinale.

Organisers Elke Seilor, Wolfgang Idler and Ezra Gerhardt got togther 260 films, 70 of them were chosen by a selection committee to compete for a prize that carried with it an award of DM30,000, half the short-film budget.

The classic short-film countries are in Eastern Europe, but this year they did not play such a prominent part. But Hungary and Russia were well represented.

Neptunfest from the USSR dealt with the boisterous comedy at the reception for a Polar Sea swimmer, but it was long and was put into the group of special productions such as the old short film interview of Tania Blixen of 1953 or the homage to the theatre actor Otto Sander.

The contribution from Greece was a surprise to the organisers. A film school sorted out the films so that only mature works from the Greek film industry, that is very export-minded, were offered to Berlin.

George Mouzakitis's film *Accelore*, a fantastic and endearing story, dealt with the loneliness of an old tailor.

From Spain there was Stefano Masi's *Hotel delle Ombre*, a tour through horror films with quotes from *Nosferatu*.

France has a central organisation for the production of short films, Agence de court métrage, which this country does not have. A member of the staff of this French organisation, Francois Ode, was on the Berlin festival jury. Seven films were sent from France for selection and five of them were included in the programme.The short film genre is blossoming in Britain, due mainly to the internationally-minded London Film School. From the School came Damian Burger's *The unusual journey of Ramses XXIII*, a slick, clip-thriller about a pharoah's mummy, that was just a little too close to a feature film, in fact.

A half of the films selected to compete came from West Germany, mainly from the Berlin film and television academy.

There were well-known film-makers included, such as Ulrike Ottinger and Helke Sander, who presented her TV film series *Sieben Frauen — Sieben Sünden*. The work of unknowns were also shown.

One of the most impressive débutes at the festival was Rolf Grape's *Hochofen im Herbst*, already honoured in Oberhausen. It was a witty, current montage dealing with the theme he developed himself of the disappearnce of coal pits in the Ruhr.

There were many short films shown in Berlin and there was much discussion over the best examples of the genre shown.

The "Omnibus" film was introduced, a new way of presenting short films, linked together into a programme length production so that they can be better distributed.

Let's hope it helps.

Wolfgang Brenner

(Kieler Nachrichten, 14 November 1986)

■ THE MEDIA

Unsung home of the unsung hack: the news agency



News agencies play a huge role in news gathering and distribution. Yet few people know much about them.

Most people, if they know anything about news agencies at all, know them only as initials at the beginning of a news report; for example "Managua, dpa/upi," or "Tokyo, ap/rtr/afp."

The initiated know that these initials stand for Deutsche Presse-Agentur, the American agencies United Press International and Associated Press, Reuters in London and Agence France-Presse in Paris.

Sometimes other news sources appear in reports such as Xinhua (the People's Republic of China), TASS (Russia) or ADN (East Germany), and agency names that are not so familiar such as Montsane, KPL or Petra — Mongolia, Laos and Jordan.

To all outward appearances a news agency is very little different from a national newspaper.

All the activity usually goes on in the huge news-room, invariably with desks grouped together with display screens and telephones.

There are telexes in the background or in another room, maps and lists of important telephone numbers on the walls, and everywhere the rattle of typewriters, scraps of conversation, ringing telephones and voices from a radio.

But even the most important newspapers do not have the resources of a news agency, that offers a wide network of correspondents at home and abroad and an enormous output.

Reuters has 5,500 employees, almost 900 of them journalists. In a day the agency handles about 300,000 incoming words to make up reports totalling two million words in news services distributed in several different languages throughout the world.

Deutche Presse-Agentur, dpa, has a "basic service" of about 400 reports a day. These cover five sectors, home and foreign news, economic and cultural affairs and sport, distributed from the agency's Hamburg headquarters. If these 400 reports were printed they would be enough for a book.

To this can be added the daily output of the regional offices extending from Kiel to Munich, and the overseas services, located at the Hamburg headquarters, covering Latin America, Asia/Africa and the Middle East, in part distributed in foreign languages.

Finally there are special services covering themes from environmental protection to social affairs and science.

A news agency operates very much like a newspaper. Its reporters go to press conferences covering national or regional affairs or commerce, and they cover parliament.

They simply cover the news. If there is a demonstration at a nuclear power plant, agency reporters and cameramen go.

If the news is red-hot it is put on a mini-computer and passed to the office by telephone.

If the news item is not so urgent it is put into story form back at the office, but not using a typewriter, on a large video monitor screen.

This report is passed from the reporter's video screen to the day or night editor's video and from there, after having been subbed, by telecommunications links to the agency's customers, who can include apart from newspapers, radio and television, political parties and commercial companies.

Agency reports are used complete by many newspapers.This means that the same report is reproduced in several newspapers.

A normal working day at dpa headquarters:At seven in the morning the early shift takes over from the night shift.

By about nine every department is fully manned, and about 45-minutes later a conference takes place, attended by the dpa hierarchy, from the editor-in-chief to the heads of the various news departments. They sift through news forecasts and snippets of information, and discuss what they will do.

Meanwhile, news items are passed by computer from video monitor to video monitor. Information is passed to bureaux abroad by telex. The day's work is now well under way.

The most hectic time is between midday and 8pm. One report after another comes in, is put on the computer and passed to the department head's "parent computer." Within a very short space of time there is a queue of 30, 40, even 50 reports.

A screen illuminated with a red light shows how many news reports are waiting attention and their order of priority.

The order of precedence is normal, priority, urgent and top priority.

Completed reports are pushed out with a priority rating and a theme slug.

A news item rated top priority, reporting the death of a VIP, or a severe accident or an assassination attempt automatically takes precedence.

During the night news flashes put out marked with at least ten bell rings so as to alert customers' editors-in-chief.

The head of the department delegates most of the work at the press of a key to his news writers, who sit in front of a "daughter" monitor screen.

On these screens appear the resumés of what has been written for the day or reports that have come in from correspondents that have had to be re-written or expanded with background information.

Even in the age of the video screen monitor this can only be done whilst the other sources are to hand in the form of print-outs.

No-one can deny that there is an atmosphere of the great wide world in a news agency, even if the days when Israel Beer Josaphat supplied news from the Brussels stock exchange to Aachen by carrier pigeon are long past.

Josaphat was born in Kassel. In 1844 he was converted to Christianity and changed his name to Reuter. Eleven years later he moved to London. From there he reported stock exchange quotations to Paris by cable. Seven years later Reuter was supplying the main newspapers of Europe with news.

Today the agency that he founded, headquartered in London's Fleet Street, is one of the five leading agencies in the world, along with ap, upi, AFP and Tass.

The three Reuter news centres in London, New York and Hong Kong cover from one weekend to the next the three main commerical regions of the world without a break.

The company now only earns seven per cent of its income from the sale of "pure news items."

The lion's share is earned from reporting economic indices, market quotations, news from the stock exchange, the European currency markets, commodity exchanges, futures and so on.

This information is passed over a network by 71,500 video screen monitors to customers all over the world. Journalism and commerce are bed-fellows.

Klaus Altmann

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 23 November 1986)

Continued from page 10

of re-vamping superficial effects and speculations.

This was not the case with the younger generation of German film-makers. The contributions from Berlin and the Munich academy were depressing and more often than not useless.

The Munich contingent particularly went in for vapid skirmishings and esoteric situations involving in-people along the lines of "Tom wants to get to know sexy Saskia. A friend arranges a date in a luxurious appartment." Or again: "Two singing teachers force on their pupils the mythical secrets of ancient music," and so and and so on.

This tendency towards high-flown chit-chat presented by the Munich academy is not the result of pure chance.

The academy's training programme does not regard film-making as a profession that requires considerable discipline and hard work, particularly when it comes to writing a film script. It is regarded rather as a chic way of making a livelihood, parading intuitive indolence and a consciousness of high social prestige.

This dilettante attitude has its roots, of course, in Bavarian education policies — the film reflects political ideas and change.

The political change in Bonn has not passed the Berlin film academy by entirely. The academy was to have been the breeding ground for documentary films of pitiless political awareness, but it has become a place where young people are trained neither for this nor that.

A script goes along the lines of "A girl is delighted to get a parcel from the West," or "A red carpet is unrolled at the airport," or "A young guy plays in a TV game."

This shows a lack of direction among young Continental directors and perhaps comes as an answer to their drift away from the real world or as an adieu to hopes of change.

This is what came to light at this display of film work in Munich, and this is what makes it important.

Günter Jurczyk

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 16 November 1986)

■ EDUCATION

Institute's role in getting contemporary history accepted as a discipline

Contemporary history is a relative newcomer among academic disciplines in Germany. Individual historians such as Heinrich von Treitschke may have dealt with the immediate past in the 19th century, but contemporary history did not come into its own as a separate subject until after the Second World War.

The Institute of Contemporary History in Munich played a key role in its emergence. The institute's development, the tasks it set itself and the difficulties it encountered have in many ways been characteristic of how contemporary history has progressed as an academic discipline in the Federal Republic.

The long-drawn-out process of founding the institute was itself a sure sign of how highly explosive academic research into what Hans Rothfels called the "epoch of people still living" proved to be.

After the collapse of the Third Reich there was soon felt to be a need for painstaking research into National Socialism and the Weimar Republic.

By the end of 1945 the Bavarian State Chancellery was considering using the material stockpiled by the Americans at their collecting point for Nazi documents as a basis for a research institute to study the history of National Socialism.

Two years later, on 7 October 1947, the *Länder* of Bavaria, Bremen, Hesse and Württemberg-Baden signed the statutory instrument setting up an institute for research into National Socialist politics.

But many years were still to elapse before it started work.

The preliminary negotiations had revealed deep-seated disagreement and

"Never again must legends be allowed to gain currency, like in the Weimar Republic"

mutual mistrust between research specialists and politicians.

Historians were accused by a number of *Land* representatives of having been partly to blame for National Socialism by virtue of the failure of academic research prior to 1933.

So the emphasis must be less on traditional academic research, it was argued, than on swift and deliberate information by means of, say, brochures and posters.

The academic response was to remind politicians of the position after the First World War when the parliamentary commission set up to look into the war guilt issue consisted of political appointees.

As a consequence, the academics argued, the material collected had been allowed to gather dust in libraries and was not made public.

Experience of Hitler's propaganda machine eventually clinched the outcome of this clash between the idea of swift political and media information on the one hand and academic research and representation of contemporary history on the other.



Politicians shared academic misgivings about history being written under government influence and with mainly educational intent.

The institute started sorting documents in Munich in May 1949, at a time when financial arrangements had yet to be settled.

Agreement between the *Länder* concerned on the institute's finances having proved impossible, the Federal government and Bavaria eventually agreed to run it jointly.

On 8 September 1950 Federal Interior Minister — later head of state — Gustav Heinemann signed the statutes of the German Institute on the History of the National Socialist Era.

Its tasks were to include collecting source material on the history of National Socialism, including material from other countries, and to function as a central reference agency.

It was to evaluate material scientifically and in a generally comprehensible manner and to make it accessible to the general public. It was to prepare and support academic work on the history of the era.

Expectations placed in the work of German contemporary historians and in the Institute of Contemporary History, as it *has styled itself since 1952*, went far beyond this level-headed programme.

Far-reaching politico-historical disorientation brought about by National Socialism was to be superseded by a new and democratic view of history. Never again must legends be allowed to gain currency in connection with the immediate past as they had been in the Weimar Republic.

Indeed, the study of history was to accomplish a process of moral self-purification.

Over 25 years have since elapsed. The institute is now a public foundation with a board of governors on which the *Länder* of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia are represented.

From modest beginnings a research unit has evolved that boasts an academic staff of 15, a roomy building of the institute's own and an annual budget of more than DM3m.

Has the institute done justice to the high expectations placed in it and the wide range of tasks it was set up to accomplish?

Its initial task was the donkey work of collecting and processing source material on National Socialism.

The institute now has well-catalogued archives consisting of comprehensive collections of material, such as government and Nazi party material from 1933 to 1945, documents on the Allied military tribunal in Nuremberg and court material in connection with relevant cases before and after 1945.

The archives also include a wide range of private documents bequeathed to it, official and party-political printed matter and a comprehensive newspaper collection.

The study of history, especially contemporary history, is due in part to a desire to understand oneself. It must extend to the threshold of the present if it is to foster more than a fragmentary consciousness of history.

Archive material in itself shows an increasing trend to probe German post-war history. The material of OMGUS, the Office of the Military Government for Germany (US) is, for instance, available on microfiche, as is post-1945 material on organisations and political parties.

The institute has no plans to compete with government archives on the post-war period, but Martin Broszat, its present director, regrets a growing tendency to bequeath material elsewhere.

Private documents and archive material that used to be placed at the institute's disposal now tend to find their way into the archives of political parties, organisations and companies.

Source material edited and published by the Munich institute nonetheless makes it clear that much remains to be done in completing Third Reich archives.

The Biographical Handbook of German-Language Emigration from 1933, consisting of data on about 25,000 emigrés, is a case in point.

Another is reconstruction of the Nazi party chancellery's archives, the second part of which is still in progress, and an edition of the Goebbels diaries.

Work in the editorial sector is particularly indicative of the key role the institute plays.

Projects such as publication of the "Documents on the Prehistory of the Federal Republic of Germany" or the "Biographical Source Material on Post-1945 German History" could hardly have been handled by a single research worker.

Two methodical objections have been (and continue to be) raised against the study of contemporary history. It is said to lack both reliable source material and the necessary distance, or detachment, from its subject.

Where source material is concerned the institute's archives present an impressive case against the objection. The risk of a subjective or moral outlook is more serious in connection with a past many historians personally experienced.

In its first two decades of activity the institute deliberately chose to concentrate on detailed research projects and dispense with overall outlines and evaluations.

Its first publication, in 1953, was Heinrich Stuebel's "The Financing of Armaments in the Third Reich."

The Sources and Outlines of Contemporary History series began with a study of legal teachings by Carl Schmitt, followed by a paper on "Popular Opposition in a Police State."

Not until the early 1970s did the institute see fit to publish a three-volume "German History Since the First World War" compiled by members of staff.

The institute's decision to limit itself to source material and individual monographs may partly have been the reason for the reputation it has rapidly gained abroad and for its wide-ranging international contacts.

A further cornerstone of its reputation has been the quarterly review, *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, published under the institute's aegis since 1953 and soon acknowledged as an important forum for the international study of contemporary history.

The list of publications in the past 10 years testifies to a trend toward a more structured approach to history and a keener interest in social considerations.

In many cases published work has breathed life into new theoretical approaches.

The six-volume series on Bavaria in the Nazi Era outlines a wide range of historical material. In individual monographs on local and specific issues everyday life in towns and villages is portrayed under Nazi rule without descending to the merely episodic or private level.

Golo Mann, reviewing the first two volumes, described it as "an exemplary undertaking that could hardly have been done better."

Recent projects similarly wide in range include "Society and Politics in the US Zone from 1945 to 1949" and "West Germany in International Relations from 1945 to 1955."

No matter how graphic such descriptions may be, they will only ever reach a limited readership, and the risk of losing one's way in individual studies is a serious one.

So the institute has sought other means of making its research findings more readily available to more than fellow-historians.

It pioneered public relations and lecture activities and sought to process research findings for use at school and university and by the media.

The latest example is a paperback series on German modern history from the 19th century to the present day.

This series, for which the institute shares editorial responsibility, combines an overall approach with narrative detail on individual events and selected source material.

The institute can no longer lay claim to what initially was a pioneering role in

"The battle has been waged and won ... nearly all universities now have chairs"

gaining acceptance of contemporary history as an independent academic discipline.

This battle has been waged and won, with nearly every university in Germany boasting a chair of contemporary history.

Yet many university historians feel it remains indispensable for the study of contemporary history in Germany. For one, essential labour-intensive projects can only be handled by the manpower and resources available in Munich.

For another, historians keen to do a few weeks' research find working conditions in Munich excellent, not to mention the first-rate back-up provided by the archives and library.

Displeasure has occasionally been voiced at universities, with the institute being accused of red tape and an elitist approach, but cordial cooperation is now the rule.

Once the current stagnation in academic teaching has been surmounted, an exchange of manpower between the institute and universities will be able to take place, providing corresponding leeway and opportunities for promising young scholars.

Outstanding historical publications have always been the result of both skilled organisation and individual accomplishment and talent.

Albert Schäffer

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 12 November 1986)

■ OBSTACLES

Police 'ignore first-aid in bid to place blame at accidents'

The police have been accused of being more concerned about finding someone to blame at traffic accidents than saving lives.

Professor Peter Sefrin, chairman of the Bavarian working group of emergency doctors, said police often arrived before ambulances.

First aid immediately after an accident could be a matter of life or death. Eighty-five per cent of people killed in accidents were still alive five minutes afterwards.

Many police officers sought refuge in red tape and technicalities to conceal their own insecurity, he said in a report.

First aid courses might form part of police basic training, he said, but two years later all that had been taught was as good as forgotten.

This claim had been borne out in a survey by Würzburg University department of anaesthetics for the Federal Road Research Establishment in Bergisch-Gladbach, near Cologne.

Eight hundred laymen from all walks of life and parts of the country had their theoretical knowledge and practical capabilities of first aid tested.

One finding was that two years after attending first aid classes (compulsory for driving licence applicants in the Federal Republic) only 46 per cent were able to recall how important it was for the injured to lie on their sides.

This position stops the tongue of an unconscious accident victim from blocking the respiratory tract and prevents the victim from choking to death on his own vomit.

Professor Sefrin says the police must attend compulsory in-service training courses in first aid to ensure they are in a position not only to say who is to blame for an accident but also to save the victim's life.

Police surgeons were responsible for arranging courses. How they went about it was for them to decide.

Hermann Lutz, general secretary of the Police Trade Union (GdP), is not prepared to rule out the possibility that there may be some substance in these allegations.

Further training courses were available as a matter of course in other sectors of police work, yet in 25 years in the force he had not once been offered the opportunity of attending a first aid refresher course.

Herr Lutz plans to take up the emergency doctors' suggestion and clarify the first aid training position at police cadet and staff colleges in the *Länder*.

It simply wasn't true to say that the police could always keep in practice in the course of their work.

Police officers didn't always come into contact with accident victims. Not all of them served on the beat or on patrol; many did desk jobs.

A spokesman for the North Rhine-Westphalian Interior Ministry in Düsseldorf admits that deskbound police officers could well find their first aid training had grown a little rusty.

In the first two and a half years of training they were given 44 hours of very thorough first aid training. A police officer would be unlikely to forget such a crucial factor as making sure that victims lie on their sides.

Even so, the Ministry spokesman agrees that further training courses in first aid are not provided for police officers in North Rhine-Westphalia.

In Cologne, says a senior officer, Winrich Granitzka, first aid presents the police force with no problems whatever. Further training is given.

Besides, the city has a "first-rate ambulance service." Emergency doctors often arrived at the scene of an accident at the same time as the police.

Robert Kühner of the Federal Road Research Establishment says the police themselves are not entirely to blame. More people in all walks of life must be trained in first aid.

Everyone, especially people who drive for a living, ought regularly to attend refresher courses.

Ulrike Walden

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 19 November 1986)

Poll shows widespread dislike of low-flying aircraft

Half the people questioned in a survey do not believe that national security depends on military aircraft practising low flying.

The poll was carried out by IST, a private firm based in Heidelberg and Berlin which specialises in applied social science and statistics.

A ban on low flying in the middle of the day was introduced earlier this year, but most respondents didn't think that has made much difference.

The survey, in the Rhineland-Palatinate, is claimed to be the first of its kind to probe the noise of low-flying aircraft not just as a technical or physical problem but as a problem for people in an entire area.

Questionnaires were distributed last spring to 3,000 homes, a cross-section of people in 28 towns and local authority areas between the Rhine and the eastern periphery of the Palatinate forest in the west and from the border with France in the south to the Rhenish hills near Worms in the north.

They were returned by 770 households. Project staff, who feel the survey has probed a research gap, say the findings are nonetheless an accurate guide to feelings in much of the region.

Nearly eight people out of ten in the Rhineland-Palatinate area feel more or less "disturbed" by low-flying aircraft.

They do so in equal measure at work and home. Twenty-eight per cent said they had at times been so shocked by the noise that they had been in danger as a result.

Nearly all had come across children screaming and crying, running away or trying to hide because of aircraft noise, yet nearly 80 per cent have no intention of leaving the region.

With 67 per cent of homes owner-occupied, well above the national average, that is perhaps hardly surprising.

Nearly 30 per cent of respondents feel their health is affected. Nearly one in six has insomnia and three per cent have been to a doctor in connection with aircraft noise. Military explanations of the need for low-altitude flights have clearly failed to convince residents. Two out of three think they do more harm than good.

Twenty-nine per cent even see them as a safety hazard, while nearly 50 per cent feel national security does not depend on low-flying aircraft.

Even though three out of four respondents hold political and social views on the subject, half feel there is little or nothing they can do about it.

Surprisingly, most do not feel low-altitude flights should be carried out somewhere else — another country, for instance. They favour a heavy reduction in the number of sorties in Germany. "When the sun shines," one respondent wrote, "war is waged in the Palatinate."

Hans-Helmut Kohl

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 November 1986)

If you're under the weather, dial a forecast

STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN

A new dial-the-weather service for people whose health is affected by weather changes has proved popular.

It was launched at the beginning of October and in its first month there were 51,537 callers in the Düsseldorf, Frankfurt and Munich areas.

The service is to be provided nationwide after 12-month trials if, as seems likely, the demand continues.

Medical specialists at the meteorological offices in Essen, Frankfurt and Munich who supply daily information for the service say the response proves many people are affected by the weather and feel in need of help.

Certain weather has been scientifically shown to trigger loss of concentration, insomnia, depression, headaches, aggression and listlessness and even to lead to an above-average number of accidents and marital rows.

Many callers have rung the telecom department to express gratitude for the new service, saying they can now anticipate critical weather and, in consultation with their doctors, avoid exertion or change the dosage of medicines taken.

There were several days in October when warnings of "biotropic weather" were given. The most difficult were when zones of high and low pressure swept across the country in swift succession.

Many callers felt it was useful to know that unfavourable weather was not expected.

"When you know for sure your complaints have nothing to do with the weather, you can ask the doctor to make a more detailed investigation," says Essen meteorologist and medical specialist Gunild Scheid.

The new service was most popular in the Düsseldorf telecom region, with 26,321 calls in October, followed by Munich with 14,000 and Frankfurt with 11,500.

For the Bundespost the new service is a moneyspinner. In October it grossed DM11,898, of which DM1,546 — three pfennigs per call — was the fee remitted to the meteorological service.

Horst Zimmermann

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 12 November 1986)

■ HORIZONS

Attempt to stop traffic in women for prostitution



Business is booming. "Beautiful, loving and faithful" Asian girls are being offered by catalogue to Western European men.

Travel operators offer "specially exciting leisure fun" in south-east Asian countries.

Especially in Bangkok, where sex tourism is big business.It is not unusual for men to spend their holiday in a Third World country where "warm and exotic" women are available cheaply.

The man's role of lord and master is never questioned. He can enjoy the favours of guide, interpreter and sexual partner all in one.

A Berlin human-rights organisation, Amnesty for Women, is trying to do something about the plight both of women drawn into prostitution or exploited in other ways in their homeland and also those who are brought to Europe.

The organisation knows that prostitution in the Third World must be looked at from two sides. Many women have no other chance of escaping poverty. There is not enough work. Jobs on farms and in factories pay barely enough to survive on.

It was difficult making tour operators aware of the situation, but it was irresponsible keeping quiet when, every year, thousands of women were exploited.

Some are lured away to Europe by promises. Other are simply taken against their will.

Amnesty for Women says that in Berlin many tour operators and marriage institutes take advantage of the situation of women in the Third World and sell them to German men for "private use" in marriage or to sell on to brothels.

More effective steps could be taken through tougher laws and through better information from the countries affected.

A first step is a new prostitution law in Thailand that is designed to help women forced against their will into prostitution to get out.

Foreign women illegally in Berlin who enter prostitution or who are sold to German men are handled like chattels. They are handed out arbitrarily to pimps, "customers" or husbands. They are isolated because of language difficulties, and if they separate from their partner, they can expect deportation.

Social workers at a Berlin advice centre which handles questions about venereal disease say Thai women are the most affected.

They come to the centre seeking refuge and advice and relate how they have been brought to Germany after false promises were made.

Usually they gullibly allow themselves to be hired as waitresses or housemaids and are taken straight to their "drawing rooms" from the airport.

The centre says that some have even had their passports taken from them. It requires a lot of talking before they agree to lay charges against their procurer. Too many are afraid that they will be killed if they are forced to return home.

In April this year, an organisation was formed in Frankfurt to combat sexual and racial exploitation. AGISRA (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft gegen internationale sexuelle and rassistische Ausbeutung*) has become an umbrella organisation for diverse nation-wide groups trying to deal with the problem.

It is planned to set up archives and advice centres along the lines of a group in Utrecht, in Holland, which has been operating since 1983. It is intended to work closely with women's organisations in the Third World.

Amnesty for Women also initiates and supports projects outside this country. For example, girl orphans in Thailand are given financial backing to learn skills in an effort to improve their job prospects.

The organisation seeks a worldwide solidarity as long as this doesn't result merely in merely meaningless rhetoric.

In Berlin, it wants as many woman as possible to take specific action outside travel agencies and sex cinemas.

Britta-Corinna Schütt

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 23 November 1986)

Panic button

Panic almost broke out when the sinister wailing, rising-and-falling tones of civil alarm sirens sounded in the Cologne-Düsseldorf area.

For a solid minute from 8.39 am, 6,000 sirens wailed their message. For an hour, police and fire-brigade telephones ran hot with inquiries.

Most thought the alarm was connected with the pollution of the Rhine after the fire at the Swiss Sandoz chemicals works.

People living along the river filled their bathtubs and sinks with water because they feared a shortage of drinking water. One man bought an entire truckload of mineral water for his family.

Cologne police said many people disappeared into cellars — including the whole population of one school.

Soldiers who wanted to contact their units rang the police when they couldn't get through. Some older people thought it was an air raid. A few thought war had broken out.

"But you've never been through a war," was one common protest as officials tried to calm callers.

It was only at 9am, 20 minutes later, that the truth was broadcast: It had all been a mistake. A worker had turned on the sirens by mistake.

Only a handful of people knew the meaning of the sirens in peacetime: they called on everybody to turn on their radios.

HD/dpa

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 10 November 1986)

Baby-buying business thrives to meet huge European demand

Trading in Third World babies for adoption is a thriving business, but it is not illegal.

The German criminal investigation police (BKA) say it's not in their sphere of operations. This is confirmed by Rolf Bach, an authority on the subject, who says the business is indeed not criminal. No German law bans it.

There was a clause covering "trading in humans" but this covered only people being sold for the purposes of prostitution.

No one could be charged with kidnapping, because the parents handed their babies over voluntarily.

In West Germany, trading in children for adoption was banned so dealers operated from Holland or in the country of birth itself.

In some countries, children were offered on every street corner. Most of the buyers came from North America, Holland and Scandinavia.

Each year between 600 and 700 children were known to have been bought and to have entered West Germany. There were in addition an unknown number of children brought in in various ways.

The existence of many first became known to the authorities when the children were enrolled at school.

Other cases never came to light. Bach says: "The adopting parents sometimes get a birth certificate made out overseas indicating that they are the natural parents. Such documents are easy to obtain. Who can say whether or not a German woman gave birth during a stay in Rio?"

He said many countries took no steps to stop the trade until a scandal threatening their reputation erupted. That was what happened in a recent case in Sri Lanka where investigations revealed that a gang was organising a trade where parents were paid about 80 marks for their child, the middle man cleared about 500 marks and the adoptive parents paid out 10,000 marks.

Most babies came from Brazil, Chile, Columbia and Sri Lanka. The Federal government in Bonn was examining all proposals to halt the trade.

Bach said the idea of a general visa obligation for children had been quickly abandoned. "No one wanted the horror vision of a border reception area for children," said Bach.

International agreements had so far not been effective. Sweden had had a little success in controlling the trade through bilateral agreements with "supplier" countries.

German would-be adoptive parents needed to apply for a permit. Bach: "When the child arrives here, the adoption is practically always approved, even when there are serious doubts. After all, the children cannot really be sent back."

The business thrived because demand was terrific. There were 21,000 vetted and approved couples at any one time on the waiting list for a supply of about 8,500 German children. Many of the unsuccessful applicants looked elsewhere.

Most of the traders had no scruples. Their attitude was that adoption was better that letting a child starve in its own country. Bach says: "They take advantage of the weak position of parents in the Third World. If the dealers are so concerned about starving children, they could send food."

Horst Zimmermann

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 18 November 1986)

Bang! Bang! You're dead

Hannoversche Allgemeine

If small children want to play war, there is not much point in trying to stop them, says educationalist Dr Gisela Wegener-Spöhring.

She and two colleagues at Göttingen University visited 10 kindergartens and watched children play undirected. They found that boys especially play war games more often than thought.

In most kindergartens pistols and toy tanks were forbidden, but that didn't stop the children. They used makeshift pistols such as bananas or two outstretched fingers or a piece of model railway line as substitutes.

When caught, they quickly justified their "weapon" by passing off their actions as something entirely "harmless".

Dr Wegener-Spöhring thinks that robbery and war are often played so children can grapple with their feelings of anxiety and aggression and also with their feelings of inferiority in relation to adults: with a pistol in the hand, the little mite feels big and powerful.

But, she says, children are clearly able to distinguish the difference between play and reality. She investigated that in an earlier study.

She found that children were able afterwards to talk enthusiastically about their game and still retain an awareness of the horror of war.

The researchers found *that the* children conducted their war games completely fairly. So it was regarded better for adults to withhold comments and lay down no restrictions until the game was over.

Basically, the children were with the game defining their own area of authority and adults should keep out of it as much as possible.

But Dr Wegener-Spöhring says she in no way wants to minimise the problem of war toys. She says it is important that children should as soon as possible be made aware of the horror of war and the value of maintaining peace. Good examples should be used to illustrate the point.

Just removing the objected toy was merely a way of playing one of society's problems with the child.

She says: "As long as there are tanks and missiles, there will be war games as well."

Eckhard Stengel

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 22 November 1986)

Ouch!

It was a case of rough justice for one civic-minded Hamburg man who caught a car thief red-handed and handed him over to a passing police patrol.

Police said the would-be thief had been seen interfering with a car and had run off when he realised he had been seen. The apprehender had given pursuit and had caught him.

When the man returned to get his own car, he found that it was not there. It had been stolen. In his excitement, he had forgotten to take his keys with him.

dpa

(Bremer Nachrichten, 9 November 1986)

■ CRIME

Minister wants law to stop criminals keeping profits

Hannoversche Allgemeine

The Bonn government wants to draw up laws to prevent criminals profiting from crime.

Bonn Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann told a conference in Wiesbaden that the law as it stood was ineffective in preventing criminals enjoying their profits.

Police officers told the conference that it was almost impossible to confiscate money from economic crime, counterfeiting, protection rackets, prostitution or arms running.

Judges, public prosecutors and senior police officers at the meeting heard delegates describe the massive amounts involved in crime: last year, the economy was damaged to the tune of about nine billion marks.

This included two billion marks from economic crime, 2.4 billion marks from fraud and 4.3 billion from other offences such as drug dealing, robberies and the like.

Herr Zimmermann said that a kilo of cocaine bought in Peru for 10,000 marks had a West German street value of 250,000 marks. He believes traffickers clear a billion marks a year in this country alone.

But Heinrich Boge, head of BKA, the criminal investigation police, reckons the profit figure is nearer 1.5 billion marks a year.

Herr Zimmermann said that all crime caused losses equivalent to 10 per cent of the gross national product. Stricter laws against profits from crime must be introduced.

Herr Boge said organised crime had become a threat to internal security. It was crucial that criminals get hit where it hurt — in the pocket.Boge gave examples from drug-trafficking to show just how severely officials' hands were tied.

Anti-drug trafficking officials tracked down a ring of drug dealers and get convictions for the men behind the scenes.

They had smuggled 300 grams of hashish from Morocco. When one of the traffickers was arrested he had on him more than DM100,000 in cash. But after conviction only DM10,000 could be confiscated.

Another example; the leader of a drug smuggling gang, who live mainly off social assistance, owned a valuable house, ran a sports car and owned a choice collection of antiques.

Police were convinced that this property had been acquired from dealing in drugs, and not, as the man maintained, from selling antiques.

According to the law this property could not be touched. Nor could anything be done about the $ 10m another drug gang boss had salted away into bank accounts in Switzerland and the Channel Islands.

Obviously it would be helpful if West German officials could gain access to information about salted away profits in neighbouring countries and the US.

The Bonn government has made some progress in tracking down siphoned off drug-trafficking profits, laundered in seemingly legal or legal businesses abroad.

Since the beginning of this year the French have confiscated all property linked to drug-trafficking.

Lawyer William von Raab, a senior official in the America customs service, revealed in Wiesbaden that the US has the tightest grip on the situation.

To some extent the profits from drug-trafficking can be monitored because, in America, financial institutions have to report all cash movements exceeding $ 10,000.

If the account holder cannot explain the deposits in the account, the state steps in. Monitoring is a matter of routine with other property such as real estate and houses, according to von Raab.

About 150 small and large aircraft and 500 boats, used in drug smuggling, have been confiscated over the past few years. Many of them are now used in the fight against drug-trafficking.

Heinrich Boge regards it as vital that the aim of depriving criminals of their "wide, illegal financial basis" can only be achieved when convicted criminals are forced to reveal the origins of their property.

He spoke of this as the third dimension in the fight against crime.

Boge has already made an appeal to Bonn, demanding changes to criminal procedure so that crime squad officials and law officers can have "a really effective grip on the enormous profits made from crime, for example by drug-traffickers." Investigating officers at the Wiesbaden "Does crime pay?" conference would answer this with a very definite Yes.

Heinrich Halbig

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 22 November 1986)

Just the man for the job . . . General Wegener and anti-terror unit. (Photo: dpa)

Saudis want Mogadishu hero to help anti-terror effort

Saudi Arabia has invited General Ulrich K. Wegener to act as an adviser in the kingdom's fight against terrorism for two years.

He commands the West Division of the Federal Border Police, responsible for government and Parliament security in Bonn.

The Saudi Arabian ambassador in Bonn was convinced that General Wegener was one of Europe's most experienced officers on terrorism.

At a Federal Border Police ball, whilst General Wegener was dancing with his wife — he rarely attends such functions — an adjutant approached him to inform him that Foreign Ministry senior official Gerold von Braunmühl had been murdered in Ippendorf, a Bonn suburb.

The murderer saw his chance to kill von Braunmühl at the entrance to his own home — his office at the Foreign Ministry was protected by Wegener's men, as are other ministries.

Early this year General Wegener expected a new terrorist offensive in the country, and did all he could to ensure that the seat of government and Parliament was protected.

He was considerably surprised that Gerold von Braunmühl was the victim of the re-newed wave of terror.

Ulrich Wegener became famous overnight on 18 October 1977. On that night, together with 28 members of the special Federal Frontier Police unit "GSG 9," he obtained the release of 86 hostages in a few minutes.

They were being held by four Arabs in a Lufthansa Boeing 737 on Mogadishu airport. The Arabs were using the hostages to bargain with the government for the release of the then leader of the Baader-Meinhof gang who was in Stuttgart's Stammheim Prison.Wegener has been able to keep in close touch with foreign security officials, skirting round red-tape. Until now states have not been able to unite in their fight against international terrorism. Neutral states have also sought his advice.

The American Academy of Achievement has awarded him their "Golden Plate," the first German ever to be so honoured. Other recipients of the honour include five-star General Omar Bradley, an American hero of the last war.

Other honours given General Wegener include being made an office of the Thai Order of the White Elephant and the Golden Key of Dallas, Texas, indicating that he will always be welcome in Dallas.

Wegener was born in the Prussian garrison town of Jüterborg, near Berlin, in 1929. His father was a lieutenant-colonel.

He wanted to be a political economist, but after passing the university entrance examination in East Germany and moving to the West, he joined the mobile police in Baden-Württemnberg.

He rose from the ranks into the Federal Frontier Police.

The attack of an Arab terrorist group on Israeli sportsmen in Munich during the 1972 Olympic Games determined the subsequent course of his career.

The Interior Minister of the time, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, selected him from a group of capable staff officers, to build up a special unit of elite troops.

Wegener's advantages for the appointment were discipline, a strong will, prudence and courage.

His appointment to command the West Division of the Federal Frontier Police in 1979 was in recognition of his experience and performance, although he is not without problems with bureaucrats.

Wegener and other officers of GSG 9 have been given leave of absence to go to Saudi Arabia, to build up the Saudi anti-terrorist squad.

Wegener told *Die Welt* that this was in the interests of the Federal Republic.

Werner Kahl

(Die Welt, Bonn, 21 November 19[illegible])

Continued from page 9

the time being be limited to the Federal Republic, but Germany owes its pioneering role to being a small country with a large chemical industry.

Neighbouring countries will follow suit sooner or later, just as they have done on other environment issues. Let us not resist the debate for all we are worth. It is surely an opportunity to be welcomed. It can certainly do the Rhine no harm.

The Rhine badly needs care and consideration. The latest pollution affair is a reminder that despite many improvements there is still no ground for self-righteousness.

Horst Bieber

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 14 November 1986)

CSU and FDP

Continued from page 4

Zimmermann, CSU, told the Munich conference the Free Democrats had reverted to their bad habits of the SPD-FDP coalition era.

They are certainly hoping voters will honour their attitude. It is a wager of which the outcome is far from sure.

FDP and CSU, holding pre-election conferences that opened on the same day, sounded more like rivals than coalition partners.

In its Mainz manifesto the FDP called on voters to cast their second, state list votes for the FDP. In Munich the CSU ruled out any such idea.

The Free Democrats again pilloried CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss, hoping their views on the Bavarian Premier would prove a vote-winner. Prevention of a CDU/CSU absolute majority dominated by Herr Strauss was declared to be a major FDP campaign objective.

Chancellor Kohl can on two counts be unperturbed by the FDP attack on the CSU leader.

For one he is no keener than Foreign Minister Genscher, the former FDP leader, on the idea of Franz Josef Strauss at the Foreign Office.

For another he can rest assured that the Free Democrats are clearly committed to a further coalition with the CDU/CSU in Bonn.

That is likely to have softened considerably the blow of having to shelve the state's evidence proposal.

Hermann Eich

(General-Anzeiger, Bonn, 22 November 1986)